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I. INTRODUCTION
Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is
beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a
police officer – are not covered by the Constitution’s free speech clause.1
But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about
military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection.2 To date,
however, it has largely been taken for granted in Supreme Court doctrine
and academic writing that any constitutional protection for lies is purely
prophylactic – it provides protection to the truth-speaker by also

1 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012). See also United States v. Chappell,
691 F.3d 388, 400 (4th Cir. 2012). There is an important difference between what speech is
covered by the First Amendment and what speech is protected. As Professor Schauer has
observed, the question of First Amendment coverage is all too often “simply assumed.” Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004).
2 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(finding false speech that injures reputation is protected by the First Amendment).
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protecting the liar.3 What remains unresolved is whether other rationales
might also justify First Amendment protection for lies.
This Article argues that some lies – what we call high value lies –
have intrinsic or instrumental value to the goals underlying freedom of
speech. It develops a trifurcated doctrinal taxonomy of constitutional
protection for lies. Some misrepresentations receive no protection at all;4
some false statements are protected only because the protection of the liar
ensures that the speech of the truthful person is not indirectly chilled,5
and, in our view, some lies must be protected for their own sake. This
framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important because we
provide the first comprehensive look at the wide range of lies that may
raise First Amendment issues in the wake of United States v. Alvarez,6
and analyze the proper level constitutional scrutiny owed to regulations
of each type of lie.
Beyond doctrine, we advance the thesis that constitutional protection
for high value lies is firmly rooted in First Amendment theory because
false speech sometimes paradoxically facilitates or produces truth. High
value lies, though unacknowledged in the literature and cases to date,
have played an important role in American history, and affirmatively
further the free speech goals of enhancing political discourse, revealing
of truth, and promoting individual autonomy. 7 A prototypical category
of high value lies is what we label “investigative deceptions.” An
investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order
3 Just as the application of the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations results in
the suppression of valuable evidence on the justification that its exclusion is necessary to protect
the innocent from police overreaching, and not because of the inherent benefits for criminals, see,
e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141
(2009), so too the protection of lies has been justified as necessary to the protection of the nonliar. The Court has expressed ambivalence about both the exclusionary rule and constitutional
protection for lies, but tends to reluctantly recognize carefully tailored application of the
protections as a necessary evil.
4 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2014) (upheld in United States v. Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d
1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2014)).
5 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986).
6 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
7 There are only two previous scholarly treatments of this issue of which we are aware.
Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat
Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (2006); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution,
2012 S. CT. REV. 161. In examining lies more generally, Professor Varat’s insightful article
includes a subsection on “Lies Designed to Procure the Truth,” which sets out some of the
challenges that we address comprehensively in this Article. 53 UCLA L. REV. at 1122-26. In
trying to predict the implications of the Court’s decision in Alvarez, Professor Norton
acknowledges that “[s]ome lies have instrumental or even moral value,” 2012 S. CT. REV. at 164,
though she does not emphasize the types of investigative deceptions on which our work focuses.
For an argument that lying may sometimes be protected speech on moral grounds, see R. George
Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1131, 1157-58 (2011).
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for an undercover journalist, investigator, or political activist to gain
access to information or images of great political significance that would
not be available if the person disclosed her media affiliations or political
objectives. Investigative deceptions are affirmative misrepresentations
or omissions about one’s political or journalistic affiliations, educational
backgrounds, or research, reporting, or political motives to facilitate
gaining access to truthful information on matters of substantial public
concern.8
We develop our claim by examining the confluence of two
contemporary developments concerning the law of free speech – the
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez and the emergence of new laws
aimed at restricting undercover investigations or whistleblowing,
particularly the so-called “Ag Gag” laws.9 Ag Gag laws provide a timely
and straightforward case study of the First Amendment’s role in
protecting high value lies because a key component of these laws is the
criminalization of misrepresentations made in order to gain access to
agricultural facilities.10 Under these laws, lies used to facilitate

8 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2014 WL 4388158, at*2 (D.
Idaho Sep. 4, 2014).
9 The term “Ag Gag” was coined by food writer Mark Bittman. Mark Bittman, Op-Ed.,
Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, A27. As we discuss below, Ag Gag laws
seek to stifle or gag whistleblowing and reporting regarding practices at commercial agricultural
facilities. Several articles have addressed the First Amendment implications of Ag Gag laws from
a doctrinal perspective, but none have situated the discussion against the background of First
Amendment theory. See, e.g., Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of Laws
Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960
(2012); Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How
United States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 566 (2014).
10 Since 2012, more than 25 such bills have been introduced. See Ag-Gag Bills at the State
Level, AM. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, http://www.aspca.org/fightcruelty/advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislation/ag-gag-bills-state-level
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015); Elizabeth Barclay, 2013 Was The Year Bills To Criminalize Animal
Cruelty
Videos
Failed,
NPR
(Dec.
27,
2013,
10:39AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/12/19/255549796/2013-was-the-year-every-new-ag-gagbill-failed; Ariel Garlow, Why Factory Farms Are Afraid of Us Looking in, ONE GREEN PLANET
(June 24, 2014), http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/why-the-factory-farms-areafraid-of-us-looking-in/.
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information-gathering for a news story,11 an academic book,12 or political
mobilization13 are all criminalized.14
At least since Upton Sinclair lied to gain critical access to the
meatpacking industry to gather information for his novel, THE JUNGLE,
investigators have been misrepresenting their identities and motives to
expose unlawful and unethical behavior to the light of day.15 This Article
is the first to consider the relationship between these high value lies and
the First Amendment. It proceeds in four parts. In Part II, we explore the
current jurisprudence and scholarship about lying under the First
Amendment. Here, we trace the development of the law from earlier
understandings that seemed to categorically exclude lying from First
Amendment coverage, to a contemporary, post-Alvarez, binary
understanding of free speech theory – some lies are protected and others
are not. In Part III, we explore the interaction of the practical realities of
lying – a complex and varied social phenomena – and the theoretical
underpinnings of the First Amendment.
We demonstrate that
investigative deceptions are valuable as a historical and political matter
and that they ought not to be relegated to the status of valueless speech.
Next, in Part IV, we argue that these lies affirmatively serve the purposes
of free speech – they promote democratic self-governance, enhance the
search for broader truths, and facilitate speakers’ autonomy and selfdetermination. Finally, in Part V, we build on this to show how Ag Gag
laws and other government regulations of lying as part of undercover
investigations ought to be evaluated within the framework of existing
First Amendment doctrine. In short, we introduce, define and distinguish,
and provide a doctrinal framework for understanding high value lies
under the First Amendment.

11
See, e.g., HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Ted Conover Goes Undercover as a USDA Meat
Inspector, THE HARPER’S BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013 2:37 AM), http://harpers.org/blog/2013/04/tedconover-goes-undercover-as-a-usda-meat-inspector/.
12 See, e.g., TIMOTHY PACHIRAT, EVERY TWELVE SECONDS: INDUSTRIALIZED SLAUGHTER AND
THE POLITICS OF SIGHT 15-17 (2011).
13 See, e.g., Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969-70 (2012) (undercover video
exposing animal abuse in slaughterhouse prompted change in statute governing treatment of
animals).
14 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(a) (2014). Many Ag Gag laws also criminalize
the act of recording itself, which raises equally important First Amendment concerns. In a future
article, we plan to examine more specifically the concept of image capture as speech. For a
general treatment of this topic, see Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First
Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 370-74
(2011).
15 See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE TREATMENT OF LIES AS
EXPRESSION
As far back as the early twentieth century, the Court articulated a
principle of free speech familiar to most laypeople – you can’t falsely
shout fire in a crowded theater.16 This common platitude embodies two
underlying premises supporting the claim that false factual statements are
not protected by the First Amendment – (1) they have no value (false
factual statements do not promote democracy, do not, by definition,
advance the search for truth, and contribute little if anything to the
speaker’s autonomy); and (2) they cause tangible social harm
(unnecessarily alarming people will cause panic, leading to physical
injuries).17
But in law, as in life, not all lies are alike. Accordingly, in examining
whether some lies ought to receive First Amendment protection, it is
important to understand precisely why the Court has tolerated laws that
regulate false speech and to distinguish among the types of false
statements – do lies have value, and what is the harm to society caused
by lies?
A. Lies as No Value Speech
Free speech doctrine under the First Amendment has long been
understood to follow the so-called two level speech theory. Under this
approach, speech that is considered to have “high value” is entitled to
robust, though not unlimited, First Amendment protection. Under much
free speech theory, the value of a type of expression is measured in a
utilitarian sense by determining that expression’s contribution to the
functions the First Amendment is said to advance – promotion of
democratic self-governance,18 facilitating the broader search for truth
(beyond the political realm),19 and enhancing the speaker’s self16

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Although two level speech theory focuses primarily on the value of expression, the Court
also tends to examine the social harms associated with a category of speech when determining
whether it is covered by the First Amendment. For categories of expression deemed unprotected,
the Court’s normal mistrust of government justifications is set aside, not only because these types
of speech have no or little value but also because the states’ interests are not speculative, but
tangible and easily understood. Thus, fighting words may have no value, but they also arguably
may provoke immediate physical violence. Obscenity is said not to facilitate any traditional
speech value, but also may undermine societal morals and cause harm to women. And so forth.
18 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 75
(1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
26 (1971).
19 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
17
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realization and autonomy.20 High value speech is subject to the most
stringent constitutional protection, and typically cannot be regulated on
the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of her expression.21
In contrast, on a more or less case-by-case basis, the Supreme Court
has determined that some categories of speech fall entirely outside the
First Amendment’s coverage.22 The second tier of speech is made up of
essentially unprotected expressive activities.
Absent another
constitutional limitation, the government may not only regulate speech
that falls outside of the free speech clause, but also can ban it altogether.
While the two level theory of speech has been incisively criticized for
decades,23 the Supreme Court at least formally clings to the approach as
part of its doctrinal implementation of the First Amendment.24
The longest standing expression of the two level theory comes from
the often quoted dictum in the Court’s fighting words case, Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.25 There, in declaring that speech rights under the First
Amendment are not absolute, the Court listed several categories of speech
that fall beyond its coverage. “There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or ‘fighting’ words.”26 In addition to the implied historical pedigree27 of

20

See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982);
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 217-18 (1972)
[hereinafter, Scanlon, Theory]. Other theorists argue that such constructivist or consequentialist
approaches are not helpful to understanding free speech. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE
A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 131 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel
Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 690-91 (2013).
21 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
22 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (describing the categories of
unprotected speech).
23
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-12 (1960).
24 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (“From 1791 to the present, however, the First Amendment has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. These historic and traditional categories long
familiar to the bar.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26 Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
27
In a forthcoming article, Genevieve Lakier discredits this historical narrative and
demonstrates through her research that neither the Supreme Court nor other federal or state courts
in the period prior to the New Deal routinely recognized categories of low value speech.
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, (manuscript at 8-11) available at SSRN:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498741 (forthcoming, 128 HARV. L. REV.
___). Indeed, there was both more and less First Amendment protection for categories of speech
that the modern Court deems as having no or little value. On one hand, prior restraints were
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these categories of unprotected speech, the Court articulated a functional
rationale for their exclusion from the First Amendment. “It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.”28 Simply put, under the two level theory, some
types of speech have little or no value and therefore receive no protection.
Among the categories of unprotected, or only partially protected,
expression are several types of speech that involve false statements of
fact, or more bluntly, lies and misrepresentations. The Supreme Court
has long suggested that “there is no such thing as a false idea,”29 premised
on the notion that truth is optimally derived from free and open discourse,
including the rebuttal and challenge of even the most outrageous or
“false” ideas or beliefs.30 Untruthful statements of fact are another
matter, because they are said to neither advance public discourse nor
promote individual self-realization.
For decades, then, it was assumed that false factual statements are of
no value to public discourse and thus fell entirely outside of the First
Amendment’s protections. The Court was unequivocal on this point. For
example, it repeatedly observed that “there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact.”31 Similarly, it declared that “[n]either lies nor
false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one
suggests their desirability or further proliferation.”32 In equally clear
language, the Court confirmed that “the knowingly false statement and
the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection.”33 Through these repeated and definitive
holdings, it became axiomatic that lying is “no value” speech and is
therefore not covered by the First Amendment.
But these claims themselves were never closely examined and were
probably never completely true. Lies have been painted with too broad a
brush. They are assumed to lack value, but little or no effort has been
spent trying to differentiate among types of lies. The remainder of this
section takes up this task of creating a taxonomy of lies, and explores
presumptively invalid for all categories of speech. Id. at 27-29. On the other hand, criminal
penalties on both high and low value speech were tolerated much more than they are today. Id.
28 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
29 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
30 Id. at 339-40 (“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”).
31 Id. at 340.
32 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
33 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
389 (1967) (“the constitutional [speech] guarantees can tolerate sanctions against calculated
falsehoods without significant impairment of their essential function.”) (emphasis added).
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whether differences among lies ought to lead to a distinction in the degree
of constitutional protection to which they are afforded.
B. Lies That May Be Prohibited Because of a Strong Government
Interest
The two level theory of speech has substantially evolved in the 73
years since Chaplinsky. Some of the categories of no value speech the
Court listed no longer count among the realm of the unprotected.34 The
fighting words doctrine itself has been withered by criticism and
narrowed almost beyond recognition.35 But the central premise of the
two level theory is still intact – some types of speech have no value under
the First Amendment and may therefore be banned by the government.
Indeed, since Chaplinsky, the Court has expanded the list of categories of
unprotected speech to include true threats,36 child pornography,37 and
expression that violates copyright laws.38
Several different categories of lies also have been held to, or are
assumed to, fall outside the First Amendment’s protection because they
lack any social value and also cause tangible harms to third parties or to
society at large. Common law and statutory fraud provisions, which
regulate fraudulent speech designed to induce listeners to give money to
the speaker under false pretenses, are well-accepted examples of speech
the government may regulate without much constitutional limitation.39 In

34 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (striking down conviction for lewd
and profane language).
35 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1089 (6th ed. 2009) (“The Court
has not upheld a conviction on the basis of the fighting words doctrine since Chaplinsky. It has
been argued that the Court’s post-Chaplinsky decisions have so narrowed the doctrine as to render
it meaningless, and that the doctrine is ‘nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality
that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expression.’” (citing
Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980).).
Moreover, the Court has managed to squeeze a third level into its historically binary model of
speech, with certain categories of speech, such as incitement to unlawful activity, Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), non-obscene
pornography, Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976), and commercial speech,
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980), deemed to be entitled to some, but not full, constitutional protection.
36 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
37 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
38 See Harper & Row Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1977).
39 Other types of fraudulent inducement unrelated to financial gain may also fall outside the
free speech clause. For example, in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 333 (1920), the Court
rejected a First Amendment claim by a person charged with discouraging military enlistment in
part because his statements were deliberate misrepresentations.
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Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,40 the Court
rejected a First Amendment challenge by a professional charitable
fundraising organization that was sued by the state for making false and
misleading misrepresentations to donors.41 In doing so, it made it clear
that “the First Amendment does not shield fraud.”42 Fraudulent speech
bears no First Amendment value and also causes harm to those who are
defrauded.43
Similarly, the government has unquestioned power to regulate false
statements of fact in the context of perjury. It borders on absurd to argue
that a person’s lies under oath would advance any First Amendment
values, since such speech obscures, rather than leads to, truth finding.
Indeed, judicial proceedings are designed to smoke out the truth and
resolve disputes; lies that distort or disable the judicial process are
assumed to be harmful to these goals beyond any doubt.44 Perjured
testimony can lead to harm to third parties (say, a wrongfully convicted
criminal defendant), to the justice system itself (by undermining its
ability to accurately resolve disputes), and in some cases may materially
benefit the speaker (by evading liability or justice).45 Not surprisingly,
then, the Court has repeatedly classified perjury as speech beyond the
First Amendment’s protection.46 The same could be said for laws that
prohibit or criminalize making false statements to government officials
in the course of their official duties.47
40

538 U.S. 600 (2003).
Id. at 624.
42 Id. at 612. Although fraud is generally not covered by the First Amendment, government
regulations directed at fraud are not immune from scrutiny. The Court has, for example, frowned
upon broad, prior restraints aimed at preventing fraudulent speech, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147, 164 (1939), and has also invalidated prophylactic measures automatically categorizing
certain types of charitable solicitations as fraudulent for fear of overreaching and limiting
charitable solicitation as speech, Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 800
(1988); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984); Village of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
43 In other areas in which the government regulates fraud, there is frequently not even a
discussion or consideration of First Amendment limitations because the issue is treated as selfevident. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 641-42 (2006)
(observing the many ways in which securities regulations affect speech yet are assumed to fall
outside of First Amendment scrutiny). See generally Schauer, supra note 1, at 1767 (“whether
the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply
assumed.”).
44 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (“Perjured testimony “is at war
with justice” because it can cause a court to render a “judgment not resting on truth.””) (citation
omitted).
45 Id. at 2546.
46 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961).
47 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.
41
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Other forms of misrepresentation that threaten the good standing and
appearance of government processes also fall outside of the First
Amendment, even when the misrepresentation is not made under oath.
For instance, when a private citizen falsely represents that he or she is a
police officer or other government official, that statement is not protected
speech.48 Like the preceding examples, this type of speech has the effect
not of advancing democracy or facilitating the search for truth, but of
interfering with these functions. Speakers who engage in this conduct
risk undermining the integrity of government processes and potentially
misrepresenting or misappropriating the position and power of the state.49
As the Court has explained, statutes criminalizing the impersonation of
public officials serve to avoid tangible harm to “the general good repute
and dignity of the (government) service itself.”50 There is simply
something different about pretending to be an agent of the government.
These lies always present a risk of injury to the public reputation of the
office or institution in question.51 In addition, because government actors
have the imprimatur of official authority, misrepresenting oneself as
having such authority presents special dangers to third parties, who
believe they are dealing with, and may succumb to, one who has the
backing and authority of the State.52 It is for this very reason that in civil
rights litigation, actions under the color of state authority are considered
to pose a particular threat to individual liberty.53 Consistent with the
current law, we believe that impersonating a public official is a unique
category of lying that, even when done in an investigative context, falls
outside the First Amendment’s scope.
Still another category of deception that is generally exempted from
First Amendment protection is commercial speech.54 At one time, the
48 See United States v. Swisher, 711 F.3d 514, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388,
392 (4th Cir. 2012).
49 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546. See also Norton, supra note 7, at 198 (observing that lying
about being a law enforcement officer harms “the public’s trust in, and thus the effectiveness of,
law enforcement.”).
50 United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943).
51 Id.
52 Norton, supra note 7, at 198.
53 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See generally Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and
Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 918 (2010)
(arguing that Monroe “allowed suits against officials who violate constitutional rights while
clothed, sometimes quite literally, in judicial robes or police uniforms, giving them the imprimatur
of the state's power.”).
54 Commercial speech is “expression that is related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
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Court categorically excluded commercial speech from First Amendment
coverage.55 More recently, the Court has recognized that commercial
speech may have substantial value because it advances the economic
interests of the speaker and provides important information to consumers
and society at large.56 But the Court has made it clear that the government
has wide latitude to regulate false or misleading commercial speech. As
it wrote in Central Hudson, “there can be no constitutional objection to
the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform
the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”57 As
with the preceding categories of lies that are beyond the scope of
constitutional protection, false or misleading commercial speech is not
valuable to the ends served by the First Amendment and also has the
potential to cause harm to those who are misled by it.58
C. Lies That Are Protected In Order to Avoid Chilling (as Opposed
to Generating) Truthful Speech
The Court strongly suggested in its Chaplinsky dicta that libel has no
First Amendment value because defamatory statements serve no truth
finding function and also cause harm to those whose reputations are
damaged by them.59 Since Chaplinsky, however, the Court has developed
a complicated and idiosyncratic set of First Amendment rules for
evaluating state defamation laws that provides robust protection for false
statements directed at public officials and public figures.60 In the seminal
case of New York Times v. Sullivan,61 the Court reviewed a $500,000
judgment on a defamation claim brought by a Montgomery, Alabama
county commissioner against several civil rights activists and a major
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (distinguishing between truthful and deceptive commercial
speech).
55 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Va. Pharmacy, 501 U.S.
at 755.
56 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (recognizing intermediate scrutiny as the proper
scrutiny for content-based restrictions on commercial speech); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984).
57 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
58 For further elaboration of categories of false factual statements that are not covered by the
First Amendment, see Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 3-11, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210),
2011 WL 3693418, at *3-*11.
59
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
60 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1965) (imposing severe limitations
on libel claims brought by public officials); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)
(extending Sullivan standard to public figures).
61 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
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newspaper. The newspaper had published the activists’ advertisement
criticizing the local police, who were ostensibly under the
commissioner’s direction, for engaging in conduct that was antagonistic
toward civil rights demonstrators. It was undisputed that some of the
factual statements contained in the ad were inaccurate. The trial judge
had instructed the jury that these types of statements constituted libel per
se, meaning that the plaintiff need not prove actual harm or malicious
intent on the speakers’ part in order to recover damages.
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama courts’ rulings
upholding the defamation verdict against the defendants. Rejecting the
claim that defamatory statements are categorically unprotected by the
First Amendment, the Court distinguished prior cases addressing free
speech and defamation because they did not involve statements critical
of public officials, observing that this dispute must be evaluated “against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”62 In direct conflict
with the language in Chaplinsky, the Court stated that “libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.”63
In the context of criticism of government officials or heated debate
on important public issues, the Court recognized that speech would
sometimes be exaggerated or even contain false statements.64 It went on
to observe that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that
it must be protected if the freedom of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive.’”65 These factors directly
shaped the scope of the applicable First Amendment protections.
The Court held that where defamation claims are brought by public
officials against speakers who criticize their conduct, those claims may
not be upheld unless the plaintiff can show that the speaker’s statement
was made with “actual malice,” meaning that the speaker made the
defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false, or with reckless
disregard for its falsity.66 In addition, the Court held that in order to
ensure that speech is not chilled, states must require plaintiffs to prove
the defendants’ state of mind by clear and convincing evidence.67 The
point of imposing this high burden on public official defamation plaintiffs
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 270.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 271 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 285-86.
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was not that the false statements themselves had intrinsic value, but that
if critics of the government were exposed to substantial tort liability, they
might rein in their rhetoric in ways that would result in self-censorship of
even truthful criticisms.68 Later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the
Court applied these same heightened protections to defendants accused
of defamation against any “public figures,” “nonpublic persons who ‘are
nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to
society at large.’”69
The Supreme Court has also extended the New York Times standard
to so-called “false light” invasion of privacy claims under state tort law.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,70 the Court reviewed a tort judgment against a news
magazine that had published an article and photo spread connected to the
opening of a fictional play loosely based on an actual crime involving
individuals who held a Pennsylvania family hostage in their home. The
family complained that the magazine story represented the play as
accurately depicting the actual crime when in fact the play had
embellished and altered the story in significant ways. The Supreme Court
invalidated the jury’s verdict for the family on the ground that the First
Amendment protected the freedom of speech and of the press in the
publication of material about matters of public concern.71
68 Id. at 279. The Court did allow that false speech might actually play a role in public
discourse to the extent that it might increase the chance that truthful counter-speech would emerge
in response. Id. at 279 n.19. The Court extended the New York Times standard to criminal libel
claims in Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
69 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). The majority had characterized
public figures as those who “commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest at
the time of the publications.” Butts, 388 U.S. at 154. The opinion for the Court articulated a
slightly different standard, requiring that plaintiffs must show that the speaker engaged in “highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” Id. at 155. A majority of the Justices,
however, endorsed extending the New York Times standard to these cases as well, meaning that
the plaintiff must show that the speaker knew that the allegedly defamatory statements were false
or showed reckless disregard for their truth. Id. at 162. This standard was contained in Chief
Justice Warren’s opinion, but commanded the majority of the Court. See Gertz v Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974). In Gertz, however, the Court rejected extending the heightened
proof standard to defamation claims brought by private persons, even when the statements related
to a highly publicized incident in which the public had a great interest. Even where private citizens
are involved, however, the Court said that the state may not impose liability for defamatory
statements without imposing some sort of fault standard. Id. at 347. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (plurality) (holding that defamation of private
person about matters of private concern was not limited by the First Amendment).
70 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
71 Id. at 387-88 (limiting liability for state invasion of privacy torts to cases where the
plaintiff shows that the speech was undertaken with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard
for its truth.).
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As in the context of defamation, the Court’s limitation of state privacy
torts was based not on the value of the false or inaccurate statements in
the article, but on the fear that zealous enforcement of state law to police
untrue statements would likely suppress a wide range of speech,
including truthful speech about matters of public concern. It expressed
concern that such tort liability would create a chilling effect and “saddle
the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts
associated in news articles with a person’s name, picture or portrait,
particularly as related to nondefamatory matter.”72
Another context in which the Court has deemed false speech to be
constitutionally protected is in its assessment of the First Amendment
implications of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court reviewed a tort judgment
against a magazine that published a parody in the form of a fake liquor
advertisement implying that a nationally known, politically active
minister had lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse.73 The Court
overturned a state court judgment that imposed substantial civil liability
on the magazine, holding that this type of penalty for even an
“outrageous” parody of a public figure cannot withstand First
Amendment scrutiny unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the there was
a false statement of fact made with knowledge of the its falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth of the matter.74 Recognizing a long history of
parodies of public figures in political and other public discourse, the
Court concluded that the threat of tort liability could create a chilling
effect in the absence of a more restrictive standard.75
As these cases illustrate, the Court’s broad unequivocal language that
“there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact” 76 does not
tell the entire story. In reality, the Court has parsed out false speech into
different categories and distinguished them by their nature and context as
well as by considering whether their protection might be necessary to
enhance the universe of speech available to the public at large. But in
each of these contexts, the Court’s rationale for protecting the statements
speech was to prevent the chilling of truthful speech, not because it
considered the false speech to have any value.

72

Id. at 389.
485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988).
74 Id. at 56.
75 Id. at 52-55. The Court may well have been concerned that without a higher threshold of
liability, public figure plaintiffs might circumvent the New York Times rule by recasting their
defamation claims as emotional distress actions.
76 Gertz. 418 U.S. at 340.
73
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D. The Beginning of a New Era: United States v. Alvarez and
Protecting Lies That Serve No Public Value
It is safe to say that prior to 2012, the Court only allowed for First
Amendment protection of false statements of fact when the dangers of
government regulation of that speech outweighed any harms caused by
the falsehoods. A balancing of the harm caused and the potential value
of the lies was critical. However, in Alvarez, the Court struck down the
Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute that makes it a crime for anyone to
“falsely represent himself or herself, verbally or in writing to have been
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States.”77 Alvarez, a local water board official, was
convicted of violating the Act when he boasted during a water board
meeting that he had been awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor for
his military service.78 The Court invalidated Alvarez’s conviction,
holding that the Act violated the First Amendment right of free speech.79
The lie at issue in Alvarez is little more than a valueless act of selfpromotion and impersonation, and the government had identified a
variety of harms to the military community when its honors are diluted in
this way.80
Nonetheless, the Court held that such a lie was
constitutionally protected. Alvarez, then, reflects a turning point: a lie of
little or no value and that arguably caused some harm was nonetheless
deemed protected speech.
However, the decision was a fractured one, resulting in a legal
framework that remains uncertain. Justice Kennedy wrote for a four
Justice plurality, which declared that false speech is not categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment, and stated that strict scrutiny should
be applied to the Act, which it deemed to be a content-based regulation
of pure speech.81 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment, but argued that the Court ought to
apply an intermediate standard of scrutiny that involved a balancing of
the law’s threat to free expression against the government’s interest in
regulating the speech.82
Underlying the reasoning of all six Justices who supported the
judgment in Alvarez is the clear rejection of the proposition that lies are
entitled to “no protection at all” under the First Amendment.83 In this
77

18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2013).
Id. at 2542.
79 Id. at 2551.
80 Id. at 2549.
81 Id. at 2543.
82 Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
83 Id. at 2553.
78
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regard, there is a holding of the Court – a common denominator of
reasoning84 – that some lies are protected. Equally notable, Alvarez
departs somewhat from the two level theory of speech by, as noted above,
recognizing that Alvarez’s false statements were protected despite the
fact that they lacked either intrinsic or instrumental social value.85 Both
the plurality and concurring opinions regarded Alvarez’s lies as nothing
more than a valueless, “pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded
him,”86 yet they viewed the lie as fully protected by the First Amendment.
That is not to say that Alvarez opens the floodgates to First
Amendment protection for all lies. The traditional categories of
unprotected lies that we discuss above – defamation, false commercial
speech, perjury, and impersonating government officials – were all
acknowledged as beyond the scope of the First Amendment.87 But for
the first time the Court also recognized a distinct set of lies that warranted
protection, and the six Justices in the majority fundamentally agreed on
the limiting principles that apply in this context. Both the plurality and
concurring decisions share the view that punishing “falsity alone” is not
permissible; instead the government may only regulate false speech when
there is some “intent to injure”88 or more precisely some intent to cause
a “legally cognizable harm.”89 As the plurality clearly explains, “There
must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury
to be prevented.”90
While there are not yet a substantial number of cases applying
Alvarez, the early indications are that lower courts are taking the cue and
applying broad protections to lies. For example, two lower federal courts
have invalidated state laws regulating false speech in the context of
political campaigns.
In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson,91 the Eighth Circuit struck down
a Minnesota law making it a misdemeanor for any person to intentionally
participate in “the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid
political advertising or campaign material . . . with respect to the effect
84 Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and
Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 171 (2009) (explaining that “D.C. Circuit held that a
plurality decision rationale is only entitled to precedential weight if it is ‘implicitly approved by
at least five Justices’” such that the holding reflects a common denominator of reasoning).
85 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564 (Alito, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 2542 (plurality opinion).
87 Id. at 2544-45.
88 Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263, n.15 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“falsity
must be coupled with some other element of culpability, such as an intent to injure or defraud
another person.”).
89 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. a t2545.
90 Id. at 2549.
91 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014).
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of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to . . . promote or defeat a
ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.”92
While recognizing that Alvarez did not render a majority opinion defining
the appropriate standard of review, the court held that the Minnesota law
must be subject to strict scrutiny because it regulated politically salient
speech on the basis of its content, and held that the law was
unconstitutional insofar as it was not narrowly tailored.93 Ultimately,
then, as in the Supreme Court’s defamation cases, the appellate court
invalidated the law because of its potential to chill political speech, which
often involves highly charged statements that might be deemed by
opponents to be “false.”94 Similarly, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio
Elections Committee,95 a federal district court issued a permanent
injunction preventing the state from enforcing its false campaign speech
law. To a substantial degree, the court in this case used the same
reasoning as the Eighth Circuit in 281 Care Committee to hold that the
Ohio law violated the First Amendment.96
Cases like these illustrate the emergence of a distinct jurisprudence
of lying under the First Amendment. Prior to Alvarez, it is unlikely that
such statutes would have been invalidated. Of note, however, neither the
false campaign speech cases nor Alvarez provide protection for the lies at
issue on the ground that the lies had some intrinsic or inherent political
value. Quite the contrary. As the district court in Susan B. Anthony List
noted, the plaintiff, an anti-abortion advocacy group, was not asserting a
“right” to lie, but a right “not to have the truth of our political statements
judged by the Government.”97
III. A HISTORY OF HIGH VALUE LIES – INVESTIGATIVE DECEPTIONS
Lying is a complex behavioral phenomenon. In the abstract, lying is
typically viewed with almost universal moral opprobrium. But this
assumes that all lies are identical; in fact, context is critical to evaluating
whether lies are harmful.98 Indeed, lying in the abstract is not even
92

Id. at 778.
Id. at 784. The court did not actually determine whether the state’s interest was compelling
or not. Id. at 787.
94 Id. at 793.
95 No. 1:10-cv-720, 2014 WL 4472634, at *2.
96 Id. at *13.
97 Id. at *1.
98 In his opinion concurring with the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Alvarez,
Judge Kozinski recognized the importance of context. As he wrote,
[a]ccording to our dissenting colleagues, “non-satirical and non-theatrical[ ]
knowingly false statements of fact are always unprotected” by the First Amendment.
93
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forbidden by the Ten Commandments.99 Recent studies suggest that
lying is common behavior, and in many contexts lying is not only not
forbidden, but also can serve socially useful functions.100 As one
commentator recently reported, “We all tell lies , and tell them shockingly
often: Research shows that on average in an ordinary conversation,
people lie two to three times every 10 minutes.”101 To be sure, many lies
that society seems to tolerate are relatively trivial and socially acceptable,
such as making a false statement to avoid hurting someone’s feelings.102
As Justice Breyer observed in his concurring opinion in Alvarez:
False factual statements can serve useful human
objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they
may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a
person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or
preserve a child's innocence; in public contexts, where
they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the
face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and
scientific contexts, where (as Socrates' methods suggest)
examination of a false statement (even if made
deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought
that ultimately helps realize the truth.103
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that at least some types of lying for
many purposes, perhaps even to gain employment, are socially
tolerated.104
There is also a long tradition of using deception as a means of gaining
access to knowledge that would otherwise be obscured from public view.
Since at least the Industrial Revolution, lies have played a central role in
. . . Not “often,” not “sometimes,” but always. Not “if the government has an
important interest” nor “if someone’s harmed” nor “if it’s made in public,” but always.
“Always” is a deliciously dangerous word, often eaten with a side of crow.
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted).
99 Exodus 20:1-7 (King James).
100 Ulrich Boser, We’re All Lying Liars: Why People Tell Lies, and Why White Lies Can Be
OK, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 18, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://health.usnews.com/healthnews/family-health/brain-and-behavior/articles/2009/05/18/were-all-lying-liars-why-people-telllies-and-why-white-lies-can-be-ok.
101 Clancy Martin, Op-Ed., Good Lovers Lie, N.Y. TIMES SR4 (Feb. 8, 2015).
102 Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
103 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
104 One recent job advice website even ran a story titled, “Why You Must Lie on Job
Interviews.” Mark Stevens, Why You Must Lie On Job Interviews And What You Must Lie About,
LINKEDIN (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141006125226-10136502-why-youmust-lie-on-job-interviews-and-what-you-must-lie-about.
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allowing the American public and the political branches of government
exposure to the closed-door goings on of certain industries. From
prisons, to mental hospitals, to schools, to the meatpacking industry, lies
have facilitated award-winning journalism, prompted changes in public
behavior, and led to major legislative reforms. Moreover, law
enforcement has long engaged in investigative deceptions to gain access
to private information without obtaining a warrant, and the Constitution
has never stood as a barrier.105 In these and other ways, disclosure of
politically salient and socially beneficial information that would have
been kept secret but for investigative deceptions is critical to public
discourse about important matters. This section explores the potential
First Amendment values of investigative deceptions by surveying several
contexts in which both law and society embrace the use of lies to
investigate wrongdoing.
A. Upton Sinclair and Lies
Perhaps the most iconic example of using deception to uncover
wrongdoing is Upton Sinclair’s investigation of the Chicago meatpacking
industry, which became the source and inspiration for his path-breaking
105 “The general rule is that government agents may use deception to gain access to homes,
offices, or other places wherein illegal acts are being perpetrated. The Supreme Court has long
acknowledged the use of trickery or deception to be permissible.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc.
v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014). Indeed, it has been acknowledged
that “if total honesty by the police were to be constitutionally required, most undercover work
would be effectively thwarted.” Id. (noting that ruses may take many forms but often they are
used to gain access to intimate areas or details, such as one’s home or one’s personal secrets). See
also WAYNE LAFAVE, ET. AL. 2 CRIM. PROC. § 3.10(c) (3d ed. 2000) (summarizing Supreme Court
authority on this point as generating the “following proposition: when an individual gives consent
to another to intrude into an area or activity otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware
that he will thereby reveal to this other person either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct,
the consent is not vitiated merely because it would not have been given but for the nondisclosure
or affirmative misrepresentation which made the consenting party unaware of the other person's
identity”). But see People v. Jefferson, 43 A.D.2d 112, 113, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1973) (per curiam)
(finding a constitutional violation when the police lied about an emergency gas leak in the house
that threatened health if not immediately inspected).
Of course, holding that the Constitution does not forbid lying is a far cry from holding that
lying is constitutionally protected. But to the extent the Constitution is primarily a protection of
citizens against the government, it is important to note how much deception has been permitted
by the government in the name of information gathering. See Chris Hamby, Government Set Up
A Fake Facebook Page In This Woman’s Name, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014 6:16 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/government-says-federal-agents-can-impersonatewoman-online#.favGY5LgX (detailing a government sting based on a false Facebook page using
actual photos of an arrested person in an effort to gain communication with her affiliates). It
would be strange to suggest that the government has largely unchecked abilities to lie to persons
to obtain deeply private information, while prohibiting private persons from engaging in limited
deceptions in order to reveal non-intimate, business details of political significance.
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novel, THE JUNGLE.106 To gather information for his work, which he
hoped would expose the many unfortunate ways in which meatpacking
companies treated their employees,107 Sinclair gained access to the
facilities by disguising himself as a worker. “I would wander about the
yards, and my friends would risk their jobs to show me what I wanted to
see. I was not much better dressed than the workers, and found that by
the simple device of carrying a dinner pail I could go anywhere.”108 One
of his biographers reports that the clothes and dinner pail were not quite
enough, and that Sinclair gained access “armed with a few simple lies,
appropriate to the area in which he was investigating.”109 Whether by
commission or omission, it is clear that Sinclair gained access to the
private workplaces of meatpacking plants through deception. Moreover,
to protect his cover, Sinclair could not afford to be seen taking notes of
his observations. Rather, he walked through the meatpacking plant,
“memorizing details of what he saw, then rushing back to his room to
write everything down.”110
Like modern day animal rights and labor activists, Sinclair’s work
was critical to exposing the unsavory practices of a wealthy and powerful
industry to public scrutiny. At the time he conducted his investigation,
the livestock industry was already the nation’s largest and was beginning
to control a bigger part of the global market.111 With all its resources, the
industry was quite careful to cultivate its public image. As one Sinclair
biographer observed, “The packers were wiser about public relations than
most businessmen of that era, arranging Potemkin village tours to
carefully manicured parts of their plants and advertising their own virtues
lavishly . . . .”112 Thus, it is fair to say that for more than a century
undercover investigations have been critical to a politically important
topic of speech that is otherwise unavailable to unscripted reporting.113
106

UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). See generally ARTHUR WEINBERG & LILA
WEINBERG, THE MUCKRAKERS 205 (2001).
107 Although THE JUNGLE would become more famous for exposing the unsanitary practices
of the meatpacking industry, it is undisputed that Sinclair’s primary objective, driven by his
Socialist leanings, was to investigate and write about the plight of mistreated workers. LEON
HARRIS, UPTON SINCLAIR: AMERICAN REBEL 70-71 (1975).
108 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF UPTON SINCLAIR 109 (1962).
109 HARRIS, supra note 107, at 70 (emphasis added).
110 ANTHONY ARTHUR, RADICAL INNOCENT: UPTON SINCLAIR 49 (2006).
111 Id. at 45.
112 HARRIS, supra note 107, at 69.
113 Sinclair was not alone in his investigative techniques. Numerous other investigative
journalists of this era, including Nellie Bly, Lincoln Steffens, and Ida Tarbell, used the same
methods to acquire information for their writings. See WEINBERG & WEINBERG, supra note 118,
at 431-32; see also, e.g., NELLIE BLY, TEN DAYS IN A MAD-HOUSE 5-7 (CreateSpace Indep. Publ’g
Platform 2011).
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B. Undercover Journalism and Lies
Sinclair is characterized as one of the pioneers of “muckraking”
journalism.114 Indeed, the history of modern journalism is filled with
examples of journalists employing a wide range of devices to secure
information for their stories, and passing that information on to the
public.115 These efforts have ranged from simple omissions to outright
lies.
One example of a journalist lying to gain access to information for a
story is Ken Silverstein, who, as an editor of Harper’s magazine, set out
to do a story on how much Washington lobbyists promise to their foreign
government clients. Silverstein represented himself as the head of the
Maldon Group, supposedly a collection of private investors who were
exporters of natural gas from Turkemenistan, which had a government
regime that he described as “Stalinist.”116 The supposed goal of hiring a
lobbying firm was to show American policymakers that the reforms being
undertaken by the Turkmeni government were real, which would help
increase the chance of the Maldon Group’s business success.117 To
support his scheme, Silverstein took what he called “minimal
preparations.”118
I printed up some Maldon Group business cards, giving myself
the name “Kenneth Case” and giving the firm an address at a large
office building in London, on Cavendish Square. I purchased a
cell phone with a London number. I had a website created for The
Maldon Group – just a home page with contact information – and
an email account for myself. Then, in mid-February, soon after
Berdymukhamedov’s ascent, I began contacting various lobbying
firms by email, introducing my firm and explaining that we were
eager to improve relations between the “newly-elected
government of Turkmenistan” and the United States. We required
the services of a firm, I said, that could quickly enact a “strategic
communications” plan to help us. I hoped that the firms might be

114 For a definition and origin of muckraking, see WEINBERG & WEINBERG, supra note 118,
at xv-xvi.
115
See generally BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING: THE TRUTH ABOUT
DECEPTION (2012).
116 Ken Silverstein, Their Men in Washington: undercover with D.C.’s lobbyists for hire,
HARPER’S BAZAAR 53, July 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 26681127.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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willing to meet with me at the end of the month, during a trip I
had planned to Washington.119
The fiction worked like a charm, and Silverstein set meetings with
two powerful D.C. lobbying firms. As he described it in a later opinion
essay, what he found and reported was that:
In exchange for fees of up to $1.5 million a year, they offered to
send congressional delegations to Turkmenistan and write and
plant opinion pieces in newspapers under the names of academics
and think-tank experts they would recruit. They even offered to
set up supposedly “independent” media events in Washington that
would promote Turkmenistan (the agenda and speakers would
actually be determined by the lobbyists). . . . All this, Cassidy and
APCO promised, could be done quietly and unobtrusively,
because the law that regulates foreign lobbyists is so flimsy that
the firms would be required to reveal little information in their
public disclosure forms.120
Rather than being praised for exposing the underbelly of foreign
nationals’ lobbying of the U.S. government, Silverstein was taken to task
by, of course, the targets of his investigation, and by other journalists for
engaging in unethical behavior. As one of his most vocal critics,
Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz, wrote: “no matter how good
the story, lying to get it raises as many questions about journalists as their
subjects.”121
Another important illustration of the value, but also the costs, of
undercover journalism is the investigation of the grocery store chain,
Food Lion, conducted by two reporters from the ABC News program
Primetime Live. The reporters used résumés with false identities,
addresses, and references to gain employment with two different Food
Lion stores.122 After they were hired, they used hidden video cameras to
document and confirm what sources had initially reported to ABC News,
which was that Food Lion’s food handling practices were highly
unsanitary and probably illegal.

119

Id.
Ken Silverstein, Undercover, under fire, L.A. TIMES 29, June 30, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 12370843.
121
Howard Kurtz, Undercover Journalism, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2007/06/25/BL2007062500353.html.
122 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
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The broadcast included, for example, videotape that appeared to
show Food Lion employees repackaging and redating fish that
had passed the expiration date, grinding expired beef with fresh
beef, and applying barbeque sauce to chicken past its expiration
date in order to mask the smell and sell it as fresh in the gourmet
food section. The program included statements by former Food
Lion employees alleging even more serious mishandling of meat
at Food Lion stores across several states.123
Another more subtle example of a journalist using deception to
uncover an important story is Tony Horwitz, a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal. Horwitz gained access to a chicken-processing plant by getting
hired as an employee so that he could gather information for a story about
the conditions of low wage workers.124 What Horwitz found was
astonishing. The workers, who were paid extremely poorly, were given
little to no training, placed in hazardous work environments subject to
minimal oversight by the plant, exposed to unsanitary conditions, and
subject to suspension for unexcused trips to the bathroom.125 These
conditions imposed great health risks on employees. Indeed, the type of
work that poultry plant workers engage in subjects them to four of the
five highest risk factors for cumulative trauma: “rapid and repetitive
motion, awkward postures, forceful motions, and no control over the pace
of work.”126
To gain access to the plant and personally observe the working
conditions, Horwitz applied for a position with a plant in Mississippi.
Unlike the reporters in the prior examples, Horwitz’s deception to gain
access to the plant fell somewhere between an omission and an
affirmative lie. When he applied for employment, he used his real name
and indicated that he had a university education, but stated that his current
employer was “Dow Jones & Co.,” the parent company of his actual
employer.127 Horwitz, then, without telling an affirmative mistruth,
concealed his identity as a newspaper reporter. Notably, however, in the
early 1990s when this investigation took place, deception may not have
even been necessary in order for Horowitz to gain access to the poultry
plant. The industry had unusually high turnover rates, and “poultry
123

Id. at 511.
Tony Horwitz, 9 to Nowhere: These Six Growth Jobs Are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes
Dangerous – They Show How '90s Trends Can Make Work Grimmer For Unskilled Workers –
Blues on the Chicken Line, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, available at
http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/5744.
125 Id.
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companies [would] hire constantly, with few questions asked and no
skills required.”128 As Horwitz reported, the plant manager barely
glanced at his application before hiring him.129 For his work on this story
as the centerpiece of a series about low wage workers, Horwitz was
awarded the Pulitzer Prize.130
One thing is not disputed about these or the multitude of other
successful undercover investigations conducted by journalists. There is
no claim in any of the charges leveled against the journalists that anything
they reported was untrue. As the court in the Food Lion case clearly
stated, “The truth of the PrimeTime Live broadcast was not an issue in the
litigation.”131 Many other examples of similar investigations have been
documented.132 To be sure, journalists and journalism scholars have long
debated the ethics of using lies and deception in their reporting, but it is
undisputed that some of these lies have led to exposure of a wide range
of corruption, illegality, and other information that is indisputably of
great public concern. While some defend the use of deception, and even
affirmative lies, as rooted in the history of investigative journalism and
as an essential tool for uncovering the hidden truth, others argue that
journalists lose credibility when they engage in deception, even if that
leads them to uncover valuable information.133
C. Law Enforcement and Lies
Another context in which lying is a predominant investigative tool is
law enforcement. As with journalism, there is a vigorous debate about
the morality of such practices, but there is also a very long history of lying
to suspects as part of criminal investigations. The practice of deception
has played a prominent role in some of the most important criminal
prosecutions in U.S. history, including that of Jimmy Hoffa.134 And while
the practice may attract scholarly and public criticism, courts are virtually
unanimous in singing the praises of investigative deception. As the Tenth
Circuit recently explained in defending the use of police deception, “if
128
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STREET J. A2 (Apr. 19, 1995).
131 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1999).
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See UNDERCOVER REPORTING: DECEPTION FOR JOURNALISM’S SAKE: A DATABASE,
http://dlib.nyu.edu/undercover/undercover-journalism-debated (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
133 See KROEGER, supra note 115, at 3-13.
134 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
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total honesty by the police were to be constitutionally required, most
undercover work would be effectively thwarted.”135 Echoing similar
sentiments, one commentator has observed, “As a society, we find living
with the use of such deception disconcerting, yet we dare not abandon
such techniques.”136
It is accepted that law enforcement investigatory tactics oftentimes
involve deception. Most notably, government officials routinely lie or
misrepresent their identities, as well as other factual information, in
undercover criminal investigations, or “stings.”137 Typically, these
operations involve government agents posing as criminals or other actors
affiliated with criminal activity in order to investigate violations of law.
Law enforcement agents go undercover to investigate crime, posing as
drug dealers, prostitutes, terrorist sympathizers, and various other
participants in criminal enterprises, to gather information that they would
otherwise be unable to access.138
Perhaps one of the most best known examples of a government sting
is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Abscam” investigation.139 The
name Abscam was derived from Abdul Enterprises, a fake company set
up by the FBI to recover stolen art and securities.140 As the investigation
developed, it extended beyond its initial goals to pursue charges of
bribery of public officials.141 As with other investigative tactics,
government stings can cross the line from investigation to entrapment,142
but the effectiveness of legitimate undercover investigations is widely
acknowledged.143
135

Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1146 (10th Cir.

2014).
136 Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media and Law Enforcement Use of Deception
As an Investigative Tool, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 745, 746 (1999).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving an agent
“[p]osing as a semiretired contractor interested in hunting, fishing, and purchasing trophy big
game heads” who brought beer, and participated in an illegal hunt in order to gain the evidence
necessary for an arrest based on violations of hunting related laws). See also GARY T. MARX,
UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 186-87 (1988).
138 “Law enforcement officers use undercover techniques to infiltrate the mafia, enforce
narcotics laws, apprehend prostitutes or ‘johns,’ test the integrity of public officials, and catch
thieves who seek to sell stolen property.” Bell, supra note 136, at 746.
139 Katie Lannigan, FBI undercover ‘stings’: Catching politicians red-handed, ALJAZEERA
AMERICA (October 30, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/30/fbiundercover-stingscatchingpoliticiansredhanded.html.
140 United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
141 Id. at 1462.
142 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
143 See, e.g., Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional
Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J.
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The Supreme Court has approved such deceptions under an
“assumption of risk” theory.144 The idea is seductively simple – in talking
to other persons, or inviting them into parts of your life one always
assumes the risk that the person might turn out to be a reporter, a cop, or
some other form of false friend.145 One is free to choose his friends and
companions, and free to choose what to share with them, but if the trusted
friend or colleague turns out not to have your best interest in mind, you
can’t complaint that the deception caused your harm. The deceiver’s
morality can be debated, but the propriety of using the evidence to
prevent public harm or crimes is beyond peradventure at this point.146
D. Civil Rights Testing and Lies
A third area in which lying routinely and effectively has been used to
expose the truth about matters of public concern is federal housing
discrimination law. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”) prohibits
various forms of race, sex, religion, and national origin discrimination in
the sale or rental of housing.147 As with other violations of law, housing
discrimination can be difficult to detect. This is particularly true of racial
steering, which is conduct through which persons discourage persons
from pursuing housing opportunities on a discriminatory basis. A person
who represents to another person “because of race” or other protected
category that “any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available”148 violates the FHA. A critical
method of identifying racial steering and enforcing the FHA has been the
use of “testers” by both government officials and private civil rights
organizations. In the context of housing discrimination investigations,
“‘testers’ are individuals who, without an intent to rent or purchase a
home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of
collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices.”149 So, for example,
investigators will send a white tester and an African American tester to
the same person to inquire about buying or renting a home. If that person
144 See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303; United States v. White 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
145 In this way, the media, law enforcement, and any other deceptive person are assumed to
have an equal claim to the right to deceive an individual. Bell, supra note 136, at 836 (“The Court
has adopted an equal treatment approach (more commonly described as an assumption of the risk
approach) in which it purports to determine citizens' ‘reasonable’ expectations of privacy against
all possible intruders, be they law enforcement, media representatives, or others.”).
146 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (describing a wrongdoers belief or confidence in deceiver as
“misplaced” and undeserving of Fourth Amendment protection).
147 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2014).
148 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).
149 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
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informs the white tester that housing is available, but tells the African
American tester that it is not, an FHA violation has occurred.150
Simply put, testing necessarily involves lying. Testers frequently
provide false names, addresses, and other identifying data.151 The testers
also provide manufactured information such as credit ratings and
employment information to housing sellers or landlords that conveys that,
other than their race, they are essentially indistinguishable.152 Moreover,
of course, the testers are all intentionally lying about their desire to buy
or rent the property in question. Civil rights testing is based on social
science methods that require control over every variable except race as a
method of proving discrimination.153 This is especially useful under the
FHA, which is violated by disparate treatment.154
Fair housing testing has been approved by the Supreme Court, which
has not only recognized such testing as an established practice, but held
that groups who hire persons to do these undercover investigations enjoy
Article III standing to bring FHA claims in federal court.155 Congress,
too, has expressly embraced testing.156 It established the Fair Housing
Initiatives Program (“FHIP”) as a temporary measure in 1987, and
permanently in 1991.157 The FHIP authorizes the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development to allocate funds to private non-profit housing
enforcement organizations to investigate violations of the FHA through
testing.158 The Secretary is required to establish guidelines for such
testing activity to ensure that such activity produces “credible and
objective evidence of discriminatory housing practices.”159 These
guidelines place several limitations on who can be testers, but do not, and
by definition could not, prohibit testers from engaging in deception and
misrepresentation as part of their investigations.160
150
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There is evidence that testing has been effective in identifying and
rooting out housing discrimination. In 1996, the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission issued a report that testing as a result of FHIP grants resulted
in the identification of 136 possible FHA violations and the filing of 41
complaints.161 A 1988 Urban Institute conference produced several
papers that identified the effectiveness of civil rights testing. As stated
in the executive summary, “[e]vidence of discrimination has come from
several sources, including analysis of aggregate employment, housing,
and other data sets. While the regression techniques employed in these
analyses have much to offer, they fail to provide the clear, direct measures
and narrative power offered by paired testing.”162 While testing, through
intentional lies, originated in the context of fair housing, it is now used to
investigate discrimination in other contexts, and has been expanded to
include, among other things, disability discrimination investigations.163
E. Animal Rights Investigators, Lying, and Ag Gag Laws
Following the path of muckrackers, investigative journalists, law
enforcement officials, and civil rights testers, animal rights activists,
scholars, and journalists in recent years have been conducting their own
undercover investigations of the agricultural industry to expose unlawful
and unethical mistreatment of animals.
And they have been
extraordinarily effective. In a gripping account of the modern industrial
production of meat, political scientist Timothy Pachirat published a book
that provides a thorough account of his undercover investigation of a
Nebraska slaughterhouse.164 The book, EVERY TWELVE SECONDS,
provides an insider’s account of what it is like to work in a facility that
kills one cow every twelve seconds, or 2,400 animals per day.165
Likewise, award winning journalist Ted Connover did an undercover
investigation in 2013, and wrote a graphic article in Harper’s titled The
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See Iowa Civil Rights Commission 1996 Annual Report: Testing, available at
http://publications.iowa.gov/1555/1/index.html. See also Kathryn Lodato, et al., Investigatory
Testing as a Tool for Enforcing Civil Rights Statutes: Current Status and Issues for the Future,
INSTITUTE
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(2004),
http://gov.uchastings.edu/publicPUBLIC LAW RESEARCH
law/docs/plri/testing.pdf.
162 A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING,
(Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner, eds. 1998).
163 Kelly Johnson, Testers Standing Up for Title III of the ADA, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
683, 685 (2009); see also Steven G. Anderson, Tester Standing Under Title VII: A Rose by any
Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1992) (employment discrimination testers).
164 See PACHIRAT, supra note 12, at x.
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Way of the Flesh.166 These are but two examples of a body of
investigative work that is of considerable political import.
Perhaps no undercover investigations in the agricultural field this
century, however, have been more powerful than those produced by
animal welfare organizations. In 2008, for example, the Humane Society
of the United States released video footage from the Hallmark
slaughterhouse in Chino, California that showed, workers “kicking cows,
ramming them with the blades of a forklift, jabbing them in the eyes,
applying painful electrical shocks and even torturing them with a hose
and water in attempts to force sick or injured animals to walk to
slaughter.”167 The footage was so powerful that it resulted in criminal
charges against a slaughterhouse manager, the largest beef recall in U.S.
history, a $500 million False Claims Act judgment,168 and state
legislation mandating better treatment of injured animals.169
It is hard to imagine a lie – the deceptions by the Humane Society
investigator in obtaining and performing his job – that could have resulted
in more positive or dramatic social and political consequences.170 To be
sure not every journalistic or activist investigation of an agricultural
facility has such striking or clearly traceable results. But the numerous
investigations over the past couple of decades are all playing an important
role in informing the modern political debate about agricultural
production. These exposés have played a material role in shaping the
debate about animals as food in the United States. The investigations are
one of the most effective tools in convincing persons to reduce or
eliminate animal products from their diet.171 Likewise, industry
166 Ted Conover, The Way of All Flesh: Undercover in an industrial slaughterhouse,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE (Feb. 28, 2015), http://harpers.org/archive/2013/05/the-way-of-all-flesh/.
167 Rampant Animal Cruelty at California Slaughter Plant, HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED
STATES
(Jan.
30,
2008)
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/news/2008/01/undercover_investigation_013008.html.
168 Linda Chiem, Slaughterhouse Owners Hit With $500M Judgment in FCA Case, LAW360
(Nov. 16, 2012, 9:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/394827/slaughterhouse-owners-hitwith-500m-judgment-in-fca-case.
169 Natl. Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969 (2012) (“the video also prompted the
California legislature to strengthen a pre-existing statute governing the treatment of
nonambulatory animals”); id (nullifying the California law as preempted by federal law).
170 One commentator has observed that the greatest protection for news gathering must apply
when the matters investigated are “of the most serious public concern,” explain that “[s]uch
matters would include felonies, corruption of public officials, dangers to our democratic
institutions, and activities that imperil the public health and safety.” Andrew B. Sims, Food for
the Lions: Excessive Damages for Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of Current First
Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 537 (1998). Agricultural investigations implicate all
of these concerns.
171 Most Americans who are making the switch to veganism and vegetarianism are doing so
due to “how much we have learned about commercial farming and animal treatment over the last
five years.” http://news.therawfoodworld.com/16-million-people-us-now-vegan-vegetarian. ,
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researchers have recently concluded the work of these investigative
groups is emerging as the “primary source of information about livestock
and poultry welfare, by consumers.”172 To the extent that the First
Amendment is animated by the goals of facilitating democratic selfgovernance and the broader search for truth, these activities clearly
advance those objectives.
Notably, as in other fields, there is no viable alternative to an
undercover investigation. Those who are transparent about their
investigative objectives are likely to be subject to the same Potemkin
village effect as Sinclair confronted in his times.173 Organized farm tours
and carefully chaperoned visits will not produce the sort of images or
information that has become the centerpiece of the American debate on
farmed animal welfare. The same barriers to investigation are likely to
emerge in other areas of social interest. For example, a consensual or
scheduled tour of an abusive childcare facility will not likely reveal to the
reporter any abuse or neglect.
Just as Upton Sinclair’s work led to federal law reforms, recent
investigations have led to food recalls, state laws, and criminal
prosecutions. In response to the prominence and efficacy of these
investigations and their public exposure of the unsavory and sometimes
unlawful practices of commercial agricultural operations, the agricultural
industry has sought to enact laws that would make these investigations
impossible.
These so-called Ag Gag laws make undercover
investigations by journalists, researchers, or investigators illegal.
Since 2012, more than 25 states have introduced Ag-Gag bills,174 and
five such bills have been enacted into law.175 A critical feature of most
of these laws is the criminalization of all access to agricultural sites based
172 McKendree, et. al., Effects of demographic factors and information sources on United
States consumer perceptions of animal welfare, J. ANIMAL SCI. (2014).
173 See HARRIS, supra note 112, at 69.
174 The first Ag-Gag laws passed were actually passed in 1990 and 1991 in Kansas, Montana
and North Dakota. However, these laws primarily targeted those who were trespassing to acquire
footage at agricultural facilities and did not criminalize much if any conduct that was not already
criminalized by general trespass laws. Moreover, in 2002 the ALEC drafted Animal Enterprise
Terrorism Act (“AETA”) was rushed through Congress without debate. WILL POTTER, GREEN IS
THE NEW RED: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNDER SIEGE, 170-73 (2011).
The AETA bill made it a felony to: “Enter an animal or research facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal activities or defame
the facility or its owner.” Id. at 128.
175 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2014);
IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-21-50
(2014); see also Sarah R. Haag, FDA Industry Guidance Targeting Antibiotics Used in Livestock
Will Not Result in Judicious Use or Reduction in Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 26 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318 (2015); Sarah Evelynn, Does Ag-Gag Make You Gag?, BILL TRACK 50,
http://www.billtrack50.com/blog/civil-rights/does-ag-gag-make-you-gag/.

32

HIGH VALUE LIES

[24-Mar-15

on deception, misrepresentations, or false pretenses.176 The laws tend to
target gaining employment for investigative purposes specifically, and all
misrepresentations to gain access more generally.177 For example, Utah’s
Ag Gag law criminalizes: “obtain[ing] access to an agricultural operation
under false pretenses” or obtaining employment for purposes of obtaining
recordings of sounds or images.178 The Idaho version makes it a crime to
“enter[] an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass;. . . [or] obtain[] employment with an
agricultural production facility by force, threat, or misrepresentation with
the intent to cause economic or other injury.”179
These laws go beyond generally applicable trespass laws, and instead
single out those who wish to gain access to agricultural facilities. They
also extend well beyond laws prohibiting fraud, invasions of privacy, or
physical damage, insofar as the criminalized conduct need not produce
any injury other than the exposure of illegal or otherwise abhorrent
practices through an undercover recording or a written account of what
was observed. In other words, Ag Gag laws criminalize lies even when
they do not directly cause any injury at all, but rather expose the practices
or illegal acts of a massive, federally subsidized, politically active
industry. All Ag Gag laws authorize some forms of criminal punishment
for violators, including prison time, fines, and restitution.180
Moreover, the legislative purpose behind these laws is much less
opaque than the typical criminal statute. The legislative history, the effect
of the laws, and the context,181 all evince a legislative desire to target
176 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b).
One state, Missouri, criminalizes the failure immediately report observed abuse. This law makes
long-term investigations that would show a pattern or practice of abuse and potentially implicate
management criminal, and there are certainly constitutional concerns with these laws as well. For
present purpose, however, we set the Missouri statute to one side because it does not apply directly
to lies. MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (“Whenever any farm animal professional videotapes or
otherwise makes a digital recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm animal subjected
to abuse or neglect [...] such farm professional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital
recording to a law enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the recording”).
177 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b), (c).
178 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112(2).
179 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(a), (c). Some laws establish a separate criminal offense for
the actual conduct of making a non-consensual audio or video recording on the premises of an
agricultural operation. § 18-7042(d). The constitutional protections applicable to image and
sound capture in non-public forum raise distinct questions that we will address in a subsequent
article. There are currently lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Utah and Idaho Ag
Gag laws. The authors disclose that they serve as plaintiffs’ counsel in both of these cases.
180 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(3); IOWA CODE § 717A.3A; 903.1; MO. REV. STAT. §
578.013(3); 558.011(1)(5); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-21-80; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(3)-(4); -3204(2)-(3).
181 See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68, 267 n.16, n.17,
268 n.18 (1977).
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animal rights activists and sympathetic journalists and subject their
political speech to disfavored treatment.182 Illustrative are the comments
from the executive director of the group that drafted the Idaho Ag Gag
bill: “This impacts our industry. So, you have to look and say, you know,
you don’t stand up on a soapbox and broadcast.”183 Similarly, an Idaho
state representative spoke in favor of a recent Ag Gag law by explaining
that “[b]y releasing the footage to the Internet, with petitions calling for
a boycott of products of any company that bought meat or milk from
Bettencourt Dairy, the organizations involved then crossed the ethical
line for me.”184 The desire to shield an industry from public scrutiny of
the most damaging kind – exposure by whistleblowers – is explicit in the
legislative record.
***
In short, deception has a long and storied, if controversial, role in
American history. “[O]ur most cherished image of the press is the
fearless reporter who uncovers matters we would prefer not to see or think
about.”185 And while there may be instances where deception used to
facilitate access to private information goes too far towards violating the
privacy of an individual, many undercover investigations seek
information that cannot be fairly “consider[ed] private, [such as] [t]he
restaurant critic who pretends to be a regular customer, the journalist who
pretends to be a taxicab fare and records his interaction with the cab
driver, the housing tester who pretends to need a dwelling and records his
interaction with a realtor, or even the television producer who obtains a
job at a food processing plant and records food-handling practices she
observes.”186 As we explain in the remainder of the paper, when the
information revealed through the use of deception relates to a matter of
great political significance or public debate and the information revealed
is not of an intimate personal nature, the deceptions used to gain such
information enjoy a unique status under the First Amendment.
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See, e.g., Bollard, supra note 9, at 10965-66.
Bob Naerebout, Executive Director of the Idaho Dairyman’s Association, Idaho Senate
Ag Committee Transcripts, Feb. 20, 2014, p. 30, lns. 9-11
184 Representative Donna Pence, Pence Legislative 2014 Update Week 7, Donna Pence
Legislative Updates & News (Feb. 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K4BB-F9GS.
185 Bell, supra note 136, at 837.
186 Id. at 750.
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IV. SPEECH THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE OF
INVESTIGATIVE DECEPTIONS
Even after Alvarez, the Court has never explicitly distanced itself
from the longstanding view that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”187 That is, it has
never considered that false factual speech might in some contexts actually
have either intrinsic or instrumental social value. The Court has
recognized the necessity of protecting lies under the First Amendment,
but it has done so only when necessary a prophylactic protection to avoid
chilling truthful speech.188
This approach has considerable intuitive appeal.
Deliberate
misrepresentations would seem to be completely at odds with advancing
democratic self-governance or the broader “truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas” that are often cited as central objectives of the First
Amendment.189
In this Part, we offer a novel view of the intersection of the First
Amendment and lying by arguing that contrary to the conventional
wisdom, lies by journalists, law enforcement officers, other investigators,
and political activists made for purposes of exposing illegality or other
private conduct that involves matters of important public concern
advance the First Amendment’s values. Specifically, most contemporary
free speech theory is predicated on instrumental justifications for
constitutional protection of expression190 and lies of the sort we have
discussed in the previous section – investigative deceptions – actually
serve these values underlying the First Amendment. Stated more directly,
certain lies are of affirmative value to the three primary theoretical

187 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (emphasis added). See also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (explaining that such a view of
false speech in prior cases arose in the context of defamation or fraud or some other “legally
cognizable harm associated with a false statement”).
188 As the Alvarez plurality explained: “Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was
used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the
exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech,
thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.” United States v. Alvarez, 132
S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012).
189 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
190 Other scholars reject these instrumentalist theories of speech and argue instead that the
freedom of expression can best be understood by focusing on the government’s reasons for
regulation. Larry Alexander argues that “[f]reedom of expression is implicated whenever an
activity is suppressed or penalized for the purpose of preventing a message from being received.
ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 9. See also Koppelman, supra note 20, at 722.
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purposes of the First Amendment: democracy, truth-facilitation, and selffulfillment. Such lies are a high value form of expression.
A. Investigative Deceptions Promote Democratic Self-Governance
One of the dominant speech theories argues that speech must be
protected to ensure the advancement of democratic self-government.191
As one of its most prominent proponents has written, “The primary
purpose of the First Amendment is . . . that all the citizens shall, so far as
possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.”192
Meaningful deliberation about such issues can only take place with free
and open discourse. More recently, Robert Post has observed that the
democracy-based theory of speech requires protection of the process of
forming public opinion193 On this view, the First Amendment ought to
protect “those speech acts and media of communication that are socially
regarded as necessary and proper means of participating in the formation
of public opinion,” which he calls “public discourse.”194 “The function
of public discourse,” he writes, “is to enable persons to experience the
value of self-government.”195
Both its strength and weakness as a First Amendment theory is the
fact that self-governance is limited to protecting speech that is at least
somewhat related to public affairs, either in the context of electoral
politics or public policy debates. While some types of speech are more
difficult to defend on democracy grounds,196 investigative deceptions are
almost always directly linked to the advancement of self-governance.
After all, as we have described, some of the most famous and award
winning journalism is predicated on an investigative deception that led to
access to a commercial, governmental, or other non-intimate enterprise.
As the previous discussion illustrates, deception and lies can sometimes
effectively uncover criminal conduct, enhance transparency in
government, expose race discrimination, and reveal animal abuse, among
many other types of illegal conduct.197 These are all matters of public
concern and increasing public scrutiny of them undoubtedly advances

191

See sources cited infra notes 201-05.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 19, at 88-89.
193 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
381, 385 (2015).
197 See generally KROEGER, supra note 115.
192
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democracy in meaningful ways.198 Investigative deceptions about
journalistic motives or the like actually enhance public discourse and
produce information that may play a role in shaping public opinion, and
thus investigative deceptions seem well anchored in the promotion of
self-governance.
Accordingly, limits on such lies of access run afoul of the principle
that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited and robust,”199 and,
more generally, undermine the central concerns of the First Amendment.
And this is no less true for investigative deceptions in the agricultural
context, like the sort of misrepresentations criminalized by Ag Gag
statutes. Animal welfare has become an important national public policy
issue. Investigations in this field regularly result in front page stories in
major newspapers, televised investigative reports, and animal welfare
bills introduced and debated at the federal, state, and local level.200 The
impact of Ag Gag laws in criminalizing investigative deceptions is to
obscure and shield from public sight matters that are indisputably of
public concern because they directly inform the public discussion and the
policy debate in this vital and increasingly important issue.201 Food
safety, environmental, labor, and animal welfare issues that arise in a
massively subsidized industry must fall near the top of any list of
politically significant issues.202
B. Investigative Deceptions Promote the Broader Search for Truth
Under another understanding, protection of speech from state
interference is necessary to advance the search for “truth,” which is
defined as broader than political truth, but extends to a more general

198 As Dean Post has observed, “[t]he difficulty is that government control over factual truth
is in tension with the value of democratic legitimation.”). ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY,
EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE
119 n.10 (2012).
199 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (recognizing a “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wideopen”) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
200 See, e.g., Michael Moss, In Quest for More Meat Profits, U.S. Lab Lets Animals Suffer,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2015, at A1; Stephanie Strom & Sabrina Tavrnise, Animal Rights Group’s
Video of Hens Raises Questions, but Not Just for Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2015, at B3.
201 In his scholarship on lying, Wright makes a more indirect claim that lies advance
democracy. Wright, supra note 7, at 1143-44. In his hypothetical scenarios, which involve lying
to fugitive slave hunters or Nazi SS officers, he suggests that lying to protect those who are being
searched for might promote, among other things, liberal democracy. Id. We take him to mean
this in the sense that the lies in that context undermine the terror-driven reign of a totalitarian
regime rather than, as we argue, the direct contribution to information crucial to public discourse.
202 Sims, supra note 170, at 537.
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theory of social enlightenment.203 Importantly, the notion of truth under
this theory emphasizes the truth of ideas, rather than factual truths. A key
notion here, and one that is often drawn upon in judicial decisions about
speech, is that there is no such thing as a false idea, and that truth can
ultimately only emerge through robust, open discourse in the so-called
marketplace of ideas.204
In the context of undercover agricultural investigations, even beyond
the legal and public policy questions that are placed into issue when
exposés of the agricultural industry are conducted, there are significant
moral and philosophical questions relevant to the First Amendment
search for truth that are also informed by this information. To take but
one easy example, while some might believe that agricultural animals are
merely unfeeling, unthinking forms of property, like tractors or barns,
many others believe that any use or exploitation of animals for human
gain is immoral.205
While there is certainly an overlap between this moral discourse and
the public policy debates on related issues, the point is that the search for
truth in the sense of social enlightenment is also advanced by the
information produced by investigative deceptions. Again, to take
agricultural investigations as an example since this industry is seeking
special protection from investigative deceptions, in this context such lies
serve to expose the hidden conduct of commercial agricultural operations.
These revelations will impact the public’s thinking about the morality of
modern agricultural practices – the investigator cannot control the
message that his videos convey, but one can be sure that they are shaping
public opinion.206 Thus, under the truth serving theories of the First
Amendment, investigative deceptions may be powerfully justified.207
Moreover, lies may even lead to a greater ability for society to
deliberate about actual truth over the long run. As Wright observes:
Unquestionably, to lie to anyone, including an
interrogating slave hunter or Nazi officer is, ordinarily, to
203 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 4 (1644); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82-83 (2d ed.
1859). See also Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 596-98 (2011).
204 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
205 See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS AS PERSONS: ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITION OF
ANIMAL EXPLOITATION 3-21 (2008); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE
CLASSIC OF THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT 94 (First Harper Perennial ed. 2009).
206 About Us, ASPCA (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.aspca.org/about-us/press-releases/aspcaresearch-shows-americans-overwhelmingly-support-investigations-expose.
207 We distinguish this argument from claims that lies may be morally necessary not because
they lead to truth, but because they advance morality at either the individual or societal level. See,
e.g., Wright, supra note 7, at 1143-44; Varat, supra note 7, at 1122.
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fail to further the interrogator's true understanding of
where his innocent quarry may be found. But on the other
hand, such a lie (at least where successful), may over time
promote the moral truths of the real consequences of
slavery–ethnic and religious extermination, and genocide.
Also to be factored in are such truths that the liar, the liar's
family, and the sheltered slaves or Jews might later have
discovered and perhaps shared. To obstruct the social
systems of chattel slavery or Nazism, insofar as either
amounts distinctively to a truth-suppressive institution,
furthers the promotion of the truth.208
One might argue, in the context of either the democracy or the truthseeking theory, that investigative deceptions do not have intrinsic value,
but rather have instrumental value.209 That is, investigative deceptions do
not directly contribute to discourse, but are a tool to gather information
that informs that discourse. The lie itself, so the argument would go, is
not serving any truth or democracy enhancing purposes. It is certainly
true that the lies like, “I hate PETA and I am not affiliated with any animal
rights organization” or “I love eating bacon and I have no problem with
killing animals” do not directly contribute to a debate of public
importance in the same manner as, for example, “Meat is murder,”210
might. However, the courts have protected other types of speech and
even conduct that is not itself expressive, but is nonetheless preparatory
to speech. As the Court observed in Citizens United v. FEC,211 “laws
enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in
the speech process.” Indeed, the Court’s campaign finance cases are all
to some degree predicated on the notion that restrictions on fundraising
and spending are limited by the First Amendment because they facilitate
subsequent political speech.212 Thus, the distinction between intrinsic
208

Wright, supra note 7, at 1157-58.
See Norton, supra note 7, at 164 (“Some lies have instrumental or even moral value.”).
210 THE SMITHS, Meat is Murder, on MEAT IS MURDER (Tokuma Japan Comm’n 1985).
211 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010).
212 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money
a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”). For the same reason, Ag Gag laws that
directly restrict nonconsensual investigative video recordings also implicate First Amendment
speech concerns. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2014 WL
4388158, at *10 (D. Idaho Sep. 4, 2014); see also ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding that the “act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included
within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to
disseminate the resulting recording.”). We will discuss this in greater detail in a future article.
209
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and instrumental value of investigative deceptions is not material to our
basic claim because lies either directly or instrumentally serve truth.
C. Investigative Deceptions Promote Individual Autonomy
The third widely cited First Amendment theory argues that the
function of free speech is to promote individual autonomy or selfrealization. The autonomy theory focuses not on the value of speech to
the broader society, but on its enhancement of the speaker’s liberty.
Thomas Scanlon defined autonomy as necessitating the protection of an
individual’s freedom to engage in self-determination in forming his or
her own opinions and beliefs.213
While autonomy arguments are probably the least weighty
justification for First Amendment coverage of investigative deceptions,
even here a case can be made. There is an extent to which laws barring
investigative deceptions, such as Ag Gag laws, interfere with the
autonomous choices of journalists, government agents, and activists to
choose how to identify themselves in the context of an undercover
investigation. Autonomy arguments have tended to focus on the freedom
of the speaker to determine his or her own feelings, beliefs, and thoughts
without government interference rather than on the liberty to frame
(truthfully or falsely) one’s identity. In that sense, lying does not
obviously serve the goal of autonomy. Still, there are arguments that
might focus us more on the way that lies may promote the autonomy of
self-identity, whether it be for the purpose of individual self-esteem (“I
am the best law professor in the world”), to gain respect from others (“I
volunteer at the soup kitchen every week”), or to gain access to an area
where one believes illegal conduct may be occurring (“I am not affiliated
with any journalists and I am excited to do this work”).
David Han has suggested that what he calls individual “selfdefinition” is an important aspect of autonomy that ought to be
recognized under First Amendment doctrine.214 Thus, sometimes
autobiographical lies may be a form of speech that may be protected as a
means of promoting individual autonomy. As he observes, “Under any
basic conception of autonomy, however, a fundamental component of
213 Scanlon, Theory, supra note 21, at 215. In later work, Scanlon modified his views about
speech and autonomy. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,
40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979). Other autonomy theorists took a slightly broader view that
included the protection of the individual’s ability to develop his or her powers and abilities and to
control his or her own destiny through the autonomy of decision making. Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
214 David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 92 (2012).
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being an autonomous individual is exercising control over who you areand who you are is, to a significant extent, a function of who you define
yourself to be to others.”215 Han’s theory resonates, to some degree, with
the Court’s decision in Alvarez.216 Xavier Alvarez provided a
biographical summary of his career after being elected to a local political
position and he claimed to have served in the military and to have won
the Medal of Honor.217 None of this was true, but the Court held that
such lies – seemingly of minimal truth and governance value – were
protected speech (though neither the majority nor the concurring opinion
justified the invalidation of the Stolen Valor Act on autonomy grounds).
Consistent with this view, R. George Wright has suggested that lying
might be better examined as part of a broader moral context, in which lies
might advance personal autonomy and liberty in ways that supersede their
moral costs.218 Analyzing lies in the historical context of an imagined lie
to a fugitive slave hunter or Nazi officer seeking to find Jews during the
Holocaust, Wright argues that lies might have moral value in advancing
the autonomy of the liar, and those she seeks to protect from harm. “The
lie may be instead motivated by a sense of the equal or irreplaceable value
and infinite dignity of persons, or even by genuine concern for the
questioner’s moral or spiritual well-being.”219 At least in the context of
Ag Gag laws, the same moral claim could be made for activists seeking
to promote the dignity and autonomy of non-human animals, a central
tenet of many animal rights groups.220
Balanced against these arguments is the countervailing loss of
autonomy potentially experienced by the listener. This argument is often
used to explain why lies ought not to be protected under the First
Amendment.221 Derived from the writings of Immanuel Kant and other
moral philosophers, this claim suggests that lies are morally problematic
because they deprive the listener of the very same autonomy that free
speech is designed to promote. Kant was something of a truth
“absolutist” in that he rejected an instrumental theory under which lies
could ever be understood in context as socially valuable. As David
Strauss has written:

215

Id. at 99.
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).
217 Id.
218 Wright, supra note 7, at 1142 (“The obvious and quite substantial moral benefits of
‘benevolent’ lies should also be taken into account.”).
219 Id. at 1146.
220 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 212, at 239-40.
221 See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW
(2014). See also Wright, supra note 7, at 1143; Varat, supra note 7, at 1114.
216

[24-Mar-15

HIGH VALUE LIES

41

[The] Kantian account gives relatively clear content to the
notion that lying is wrong because it violates human
autonomy. Lying forces the victim to pursue the speaker's
objectives instead of the victim's own objectives. If the
capacity to decide upon a plan of life and to determine
one's own objectives is integral to human nature, lies that
are designed to manipulate people are a uniquely severe
offense against human autonomy.222
A couple of factors might mitigate the concern over listener autonomy
in the context of investigative deceptions, including the Ag Gag laws.
First, the agricultural employee who is lied to and allows access to a
commercial facility or record is unlikely to be directly harmed by the lie
in any material way. That is, to the extent that her autonomy is lost by
being persuaded to permit an undercover investigator to enter an
agricultural facility, it is not a personal loss, as it would be if her
individual privacy were somehow compromised by the exchange. Lies
that facilitate access to intimate, personal details may very well work too
much harm to the listener’s autonomy to be tolerated by the autonomy
theory. One could argue that the business’s autonomy is harmed by the
lie insofar as it has lost complete control over its property. But it is not
clear that a conception of autonomy grounded in a right to be free from
whistleblowers and exposés ought to be taken seriously, and as long as
there are still limits on collecting obviously protected information such
as trade secrets or tax records, the harm of that autonomy loss is minimal
or non-existent.223 Moreover, there is an “unclean hands” argument that
where unsavory or illegal conduct is occurring and the business’s
employees are arguably complicit (or vicariously responsible), the loss of
listener autonomy that occurs when an investigator lies to gain access to
the property is at least less of a concern than it would be in other
contexts.224
222 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334, 335 (1991). See also C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55
VAND. L. REV. 891, 910 (2002).
223 See infra notes 270, 323 and accompanying text.
224 Other leading scholars have rejected the view that lying harms the autonomy of listeners
in all contexts. Wright, for example, suggests that a lie might paradoxically enhance rather than
diminish the listener’s autonomy. Wright, supra note 7, at 1145. He observes, “[c]ould not a lie
to a murderous SS officer also promote the rationality, personhood, or dignity of that SS officer
over the longer term?”. Id. at 1143. Professor Volokh and Weinstein argued in their amicus brief
to the Court in Alvarez that the Court ought to recognize a categorical exemption from
constitutional protection for knowing falsehoods, while allowing narrow exceptions for
“statements about the government, science, and history in order to avoid an undue chilling effect
on true factual statements, statements of opinion, or other constitutionally valuable expression.”
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V. DOCTRINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION OF HIGH VALUE LIES
The previous section sought to demonstrate that, properly understood,
investigative deceptions are a type of speech that is covered by the First
Amendment. The remaining task is to describe how current doctrine
would apply to laws that regulate or prohibit such lies, including Ag Gag
statutes. In the following sections, we offer a thorough discussion of the
appropriate level of scrutiny and identify the key limiting principles
applicable to First Amendment protections for high value lies.
A. Considering and Applying the Proper Level of Scrutiny for Laws
Criminalizing Investigative Deceptions
1. Strict Scrutiny
a. Reading the Alvarez Plurality Tea Leaves
Alvarez is the lone Supreme Court decision to directly address the
First Amendment protection owed to lies. Because it is a fractured
plurality opinion, the status of lies under the Constitution remains
somewhat obscured. Six justices clearly held that some lies – even
intentional, self-promoting lies – constitute protected speech.225
Likewise, six Justices recognize that only lies that cause material harm to
the listener fall outside of the First Amendment as unprotected speech.226
The First Amendment extends beyond truth. The question of whether the
Constitution requires strict or merely heightened scrutiny of government
regulation of lies is much more opaque.
Because Alvarez includes no majority consensus on whether strict
scrutiny applies, lower courts must toil through the impenetrable rule
from Marks v. United States,227 which instructed that non-majority
Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 2-11, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL
3693418, at *2-*11. Their rationale for this argument, however, is based primarily on a concern
that allowing some protection for intentional lies might undermine the coherence of First
Amendment doctrine and also lead to precedents that would dilute the strict scrutiny standard
because courts would be inclined to uphold many government regulations of false statements of
fact. Id. at 2.
225 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544-45 (2012).
226 Id. at 2545.
227 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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opinions will generally create precedent. Under the Marks rule, “[w]hen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds.”228 Of course when it comes to
judicial reasoning the term “narrow” is rarely illuminating. For example,
when the fundamental difference between the opinions concurring in the
result is a core doctrinal disagreement, such as determining the applicable
level of scrutiny, it may very well be that the Marks rule does not provide
a single clear holding on that question.229 The difference between
intermediate and strict scrutiny is one of kind not of breadth, and so it is
simply not the case that one opinion is necessarily narrower than the
other.230 Marks’s narrowest grounds rule cannot and does not stand for
the view that when the Court is fractured, the holding constitutes the
opinion that articulates the most parsimonious view of constitutional
rights.
Accordingly, while Alvarez reflects a clear majority rejecting the
notion that lies are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment, it
may not squarely answer the question of the degree of scrutiny that
applies.231 Notably, a prior study of the Court’s own use of the Marks
rule suggests that when, as with Alvarez, there is no true common
denominator of reasoning, no true narrowest grounds, the Court tends to
defer to the lower courts in how to define the precedent from a prior
Supreme Court plurality.232 Under this view, the precedential value of a
plurality may be upward flowing from lower courts to the Supreme
Court.233 Notably, a number of lower courts have held that strict scrutiny
is the proper level of scrutiny for government actions prohibiting lies.234
228

Id.
Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic
Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 994 (2013) (explaining the Marks rule’s proper application).
230 See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that a plurality holding is “the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices
would have assented if forced to choose”); Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2010)
(recognizing that, in the absence of a true commonality of reasoning, there is no binding holding
from the Supreme Court).
231 Id.
232 Marceau, supra note 229, at 994.
233 Id.
234
See, e.g., American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, 2014 WL 6676517 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (recognizing that when the lies at
issue are “political expression” the speech is “entitled to even greater First Amendment protection
than the speech at issue in Alvarez”); O'Neill v. Crawford, 970 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio 2012) (“The
Alvarez court recognized that not only must the restriction meet the “compelling interest test,” but
the restriction must be “actually necessary” to achieve its interest.”); State ex rel. Loughry v.
Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 517 (2012) (quoting the plurality opinion from Alvarez for the view that
229
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b. Restrictions on High Value Lies Warrant Strict Scrutiny
The first two-thirds of this Article painstakingly develops the claim
that not all lies are equal and that lies told in order to gain access to nonintimate information of considerable public concern ought to be
recognized as distinct from all other lies. These investigative deceptions
– misrepresentations that made the work of Upton Sinclair and his
modern day heirs possible – should receive the utmost constitutional
protection. Insofar as investigative deceptions facilitate the underlying
goals of truth and self-governance undergirding the freedom of speech,
such lies deserve correspondingly more protection than lies which are
protected only because the failure to do so might chill otherwise protected
speech. That is to say, the protection of intrinsically valuable lies surely
must take priority over the protection of lies that are of no value.235
Accordingly, whether Alvarez prescribes strict scrutiny for all lies is of
no moment when assessing whether high value lies are deserving of strict
scrutiny.
In a decision addressing the constitutionality of a law that
criminalized lies told about ballot initiatives, the Eighth Circuit held that
because the law in question regulated politically salient speech on the
basis of its content, it must be subject to strict scrutiny.236 Analogous
reasoning compels the conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to
investigative deceptions, like those criminalized by Ag Gag statutes. In
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, the only reported decision in a
challenge to an Ag Gag law, Judge Winmill denied a motion to dismiss
by explaining, in relevant part, that laws criminalizing lies are contentbased and warrant strict scrutiny.237 This reasoning is unassailable.
“[W]hen the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the least
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.”); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint
Against O'Toole, 141 Ohio St. 3d 355, 363 (2014) (assuming the application of strict scrutiny and
observing “Alvarez does not consider whether the state can ever have a compelling interest in
restricting false speech solely on the basis that it is false so that such prohibition could withstand
strict scrutiny.”).
235 See Norton, supra note 7, at 163 (arguing that “[t]he very ubiquity and diversity of lies
thus supports a presumption that lies are fully protected by the First Amendment and that
government therefore generally may not regulate them unless it satisfies strict scrutiny.”).
236 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011) (summarizing
Supreme Court doctrine and recognizing that speech limits – even if indirect, such as limits on
tort verdicts – that limit speech “about matters of public concern” are subject to the highest
scrutiny) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)); id. at 636 (“We do not, of
course, hold today that a state may never regulate false speech in this context. Rather, we hold
that it may only do so when it satisfies the First Amendment test required for content-based speech
restrictions: that any regulation be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.”).
237 ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (D. Idaho Sep. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 4388158.

[24-Mar-15

HIGH VALUE LIES

45

Whatever level of constitutional protection is ultimately deemed
appropriate for lies like those at issue in Alvarez – lies described as
nothing more than a “pathetic attempt to gain respect”238 – investigative
deceptions that tend to facilitate truth and democratic debate ought to
receive the highest level of protection.
c. Strict Scrutiny Under Standard First Amendment Doctrine
Even setting aside for a moment Alvarez and other lie-specific case
law, it would be “puzzling”239 to conclude that laws banning investigative
deceptions would not receive strict scrutiny. Any law that is content
discriminatory is subject to the most exacting standard of review,240
which requires that the government show that the law in question is the
least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest.241
Taking Ag Gag laws as an example, laws that criminalize
investigative deceptions are indisputably content-based. Outlawing only
parodies or jokes but not other types of expression would surely
constitute a content-based limitation.242 Similarly, distinguishing
between serious political speech and comical speech is not permitted. For
the law to distinguish between truthful and untrue speech is to favor one
form of content over another. If false statements are categorically exempt
from the reach of the First Amendment, then perhaps the content
discrimination in this context would not matter. But if we have
successfully made the case that investigative deceptions are not exempt
from constitutional scrutiny, then Ag Gag laws and their ilk are content
based on this reasoning alone.
Moreover, Ag Gag laws are twice content-based. In addition to
discriminating between truthful and false speech, these laws discriminate
based on the content of speech because they specifically apply only to
statements made in the context of gaining access to agricultural facilities.
The reason the Court imposes heightened scrutiny on viewpoint and
content discriminatory laws is that such laws raise serious concerns that
the government is using its power to control and distort public

238

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).
Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 5,
2012
1:57
PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_first_amendment_and_the_right_to_lie/
(summarizing Alvarez concurrence suggesting intermediate scrutiny).
240 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
241 Id. at 668. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
242 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680.
239
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discourse.243 State action that protects agricultural facilities, but not other
private business enterprises suggests that the government wishes to skew
the debate about agricultural practices by steering public scrutiny away
from this particular range of topics. A generally applicable law
prohibiting all investigative deceptions would present a more challenging
constitutional question.244 But the Ag Gag laws criminalize only
deceptions used to gain access and report on a single, massive and
publicly important industry – indeed, in the rural states where these laws
are most common agriculture may be the largest employer in the state.245
These same legislatures have not prohibited misrepresentations made to
gain access to child care facilities, large banks, workplaces where labor
law violations may be occurring, or companies that dispose of toxic waste
material, just to name a few examples of other regulated businesses where
undercover investigations have occurred.
Ag Gag laws single out the agricultural industry for protection against
misrepresentations. Both the distinction between truth and falsity, and
the effort to safeguard a single industry from the likes of investigative
reporters, thereby driving certain information from the marketplace of
public discourse, are independently sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny for
Ag Gag laws.
That is not to say that investigative deceptions can never be
criminalized. A journalist’s efforts to expose national security matters or
trade secrets may well constitute the sort of lie for which strict scrutiny is
satisfied.246 A trickier question would be the use of deception to gain
243 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991) (stating that content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”).
244 Generally applicable laws that have only an incidental effect on speech activities are
subject to intermediate scrutiny. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
Accordingly, traffic laws and the like are common examples of laws that, though they may impede
a journalists efforts to gather a story, are not unconstitutional. By contrast, laws that criminalize
the very means of gathering a story (misrepresentation) and do so in a manner that distinguishes
among the type of targets for investigations can hardly be considered generally applicable laws.
245 See, e.g., Sean Ellis, Ag industry gives Idaho’s economy a boost, Idaho State Journal (Jan.
9, 2011), http://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/ag-industry-gives-idaho-s-economy-aboost/article_38912470-1c85-11e0-b19a-001cc4c002e0.html; Di Lewis, Agriculture a Growing
Contributor
to
Utah
Economy,
Utah
Business
(Feb.
11,
2013),
http://www.utahbusiness.com/articles/view/agriculture_a_growing_contributor_to_utah_econo
my; Charles O’Brien, Agriculture sector continues to grow in the Iowa economy,
IOWASTATEDAILY.COM
(Mar.
12,
2013,
12:00
AM),
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_61e433f0-89af-11e2-9ada-0019bb2963f4.html.
246 Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (2014) (“Privacy
regulations are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. . . . Although the First Amendment creates
a barrier to the enforcement of new and existing information laws, that barrier is not
insurmountable. It simply requires, as it should, a lively inquiry into whether the harms caused by
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access to a facility or process by someone who does not know that trade
secrets or other interests would be exposed or injured. Assuming trade
secret laws and other privacy protections of this sort in the commercial
context can withstand constitutional scrutiny,247 we think that the proper
standard in assessing liability under the laws in such circumstances would
be the public figure defamation standard.248 That is, if the person is
malicious or reckless in revealing or benefitting from such protectable
interests, then the lies told to gain access and the publication of such
information can be criminalized. In this way, persons who lie with the
intent of exposing a competitor’s trade secrets or to cause physical injury
to the facility can be criminalized without risking First Amendment
injury. By contrast, most lies that result in the exposure of unsavory or
illegal industry practices but do not compromise intellectual property or
trade secrets, will be protected insofar as they are not made with the intent
or reckless disregard of the risk of exposing trade secrets or similarly
protectable interests.249 Upton Sinclair may have gained access to things
that the slaughterhouse owner wished he had not seen, but he did not
expose (nor did he intend to expose) any properly protected intellectual
property.
d. Strict Scrutiny under R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
An alternative doctrinal approach to examining the constitutionality
of Ag Gag laws and other prohibitions on investigative deceptions would
not even necessitate the analytically prior conclusion that investigative
deceptions are speech covered by the First Amendment. In R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, the Supreme Court held that laws regulating even unprotected
speech must be subjected to strict scrutiny if they discriminate within that
category of unprotected speech on the basis of content.250 After he
allegedly burned a cross on the property of an African American family,
the defendant was charged under a city ordinance that prohibited the
display of a symbol which the defendant has reason to know “arouses
the collection of information are probable enough, and serious enough, to outweigh the right to
learn things.”).
247 Id.
248 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
249 To the extent that trade secret liability is defined too broadly or generically, these laws
would themselves fail First Amendment scrutiny. And if deception is used to access a facility
that contains trade secrets or the like, then certainly the investigator or reporter can take
precautions to avoid revealing any of these protected secrets, just as any other employee would
do. And a failure to take such precautions might justify liability under a statute punishing reckless
disclosures of such information.
250 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
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anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.”251 The state courts that had interpreted the ordinance
had narrowed its construction to cover only conduct that was itself
unprotected speech in the form of fighting words as defined by the
Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.252
Notwithstanding the assumption that the ordinance only prohibited
fighting words, the Court held that the ordinance was facially
unconstitutional because “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely
on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”253 As explained by
Justice Scalia,
What [the cases announcing categories of unprotected
speech] mean is that these areas of speech can,
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories
of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that
they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.254
The Court elaborated further by drawing on the example of unprotected
defamation. “[T]he government may proscribe libel,” it said, “but it may
not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel
critical of the government.”255 By similar reasoning, even if the
government could criminalize lying in general (or lying to gain access
more specifically), criminalizing lies to gain access and expose only a
single industry must be subject to strict scrutiny.
The regulation of lies by Ag Gag laws and similar statutes
discriminates based on the type of facility sought to be accessed, and in
some instances based on whether the individual intends to help or hurt
the industry.256 Thus even if investigative deceptions might be generally
proscribable, the law serves to effect a content-based discrimination
“unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”257
To make this point more concrete, consider that the Alvarez plurality
in dicta suggests that not all lies will constitute protected speech. In
251

Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
Id. at 381.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
255 Id. at 384.
256 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(d) (criminalizing lies used to gain employment
but only if the individual intends to cause (economic) harm to the agricultural industry).
257 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
252
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particular both the plurality and the concurring opinion single out lies that
harm another party, such as fraudulently obtaining employment for which
one is not qualified, as an example of the type of lie that can be
proscribed.258 As the plurality explains, “[w]here false claims are made
to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say
offers of employment,” the First Amendment generally provides no
protection.”259 On its face this passage seems to provide support for the
view that laws criminalizing misrepresentations to gain employment are
not protected by the First Amendment.260 But when the prohibition is
industry specific (or motivated by speech suppressing impulses261), strict
scrutiny is required.
The crux of R.A.V.’s analysis is that while the government may
suppress certain categories of speech because of the harms that are
uniquely associated with their expression, it may not discriminate within
those categories because of its hostility toward its non-proscribable
content or viewpoint. Just as it is permissible to criminalize all threats,
but impermissible to criminalize only threats based on a particular
viewpoint, so too it is flawed to assume that because (hypothetically) all
lies to gain employment may be criminalized, lies to gain employment in
one particular industry to expose misconduct can be criminalized.
Even if we were to concede that false statements of fact are a
particularly worthless and harmful category of expression in the context
of gaining employment or access, the state still would be constitutionally
forbidden to criminalize lies in a selective manner reflecting its interest
not in promoting truthfulness generally, but in inhibiting a lies in a
particular realm of public discourse.262 As one leading First Amendment
scholar has observed, “Singling out one or a small group of lies for
258

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
Id.
260 Obviously, criminalizing lies to gain access unrelated to employment are unaffected by
this dicta from Alvarez. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(a)-(c).
261 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 452 (1996) (recognizing that the core inquiry
in assessing whether a law is content-based is ferreting out improper legislative motive). See also
Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 85-87 (2003).
262 Although this type of discrimination differs slightly from content regulation about
particular ideas, as in R.A.V., it is the conceptual parallel of that decision. Ag Gag laws are not
designed to address the distortion of truth in the same sense as, say, perjury laws, but are rather
motivated by the government’s desire to prohibit revealing information about a particular topic –
the mistreatment of animals by commercial agriculture facilities. And this is not just any run of
the mill topic, but one that has been the subject of intense public discourse in recent years. Such
laws regulate lies not for the sake of regulating falsity, but to protect big agriculture from public
scrutiny.
259

50

HIGH VALUE LIES

[24-Mar-15

government condemnation, while leaving others unregulated, signifies a
“realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”263
2. Intermediate Scrutiny – High Value Lies as a Hybrid Speech
Category
Although we think it less plausible, we consider an additional
possibility, which is that laws targeting investigative deceptions might be
subject to intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny under First
Amendment doctrine.264 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Alvarez for
himself and Justice Kagan suggests a preference for intermediate scrutiny
as to the type of lie at issue in that case.265 As discussed above,
investigative deceptions like those criminalized by Ag Gag statutes are
materially distinguishable from the sort of lie at issue in Alvarez, which
did not touch upon issues of public concern. Thus, even if Breyer’s
concurrence were viewed as the Alvarez holding on this question, it is
unlikely that this opinion would be controlling in the context of high
value, investigative deceptions.266 Nonetheless, even if intermediate
scrutiny did apply, we think such laws are still vulnerable to invalidation.
When a law is deemed content-neutral, the Supreme Court employs a
formulation of intermediate scrutiny drawn from its cases evaluating the
constitutionality of content neutral regulations of the time, place, or
manner of expression in public forums.267 In these cases, the Court has
263

Varat, supra note 7, at 1118 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)).
See Norton, supra note 7, at 183 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard for evaluating government regulation of lies).
265 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (“in this case, the Court's term
‘intermediate scrutiny’ describes what I think we should do”).
266 Other potential arguments for considering intermediate scrutiny would be that lies are a
sui generis type of speech, like commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Likewise, laws of general applicability that govern
conduct are typically afforded intermediate scrutiny. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
267 Another version of intermediate scrutiny had previously emerged in cases examining the
constitutionality of government regulations of expressive conduct. In those cases, the Court held
that the regulation can only be upheld if “it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court has essentially acknowledged
that time, place, or manner and speech/conduct tests are now the same standard. See Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798
(1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984); see also
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the
Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 167-70 (1995) (describing the Court’s
merger of the time, place, or manner test with the speech/conduct test as the “Ward/O’Brien
rule.”). Moreover, it is “the Ward statement of the test has become the standard formulation.” For
264
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said that such laws must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest,” and they must “leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”268 While this test is not
as rigorous as strict scrutiny, it still imposes a substantial burden on the
government in defending a law and is considered a form of heightened
review.269 Indeed, the Court’s most recent invocation of intermediate
scrutiny in McCullen v. Coakley is revealing.270 Not only did the Court
strike down a Massachusetts law that criminalized the mere conduct of
standing (even without speaking or picketing) within 35 feet of the
entrance of an abortion clinic,271 it emphasized that laws that impinge
speech for content-neutral reasons will face exacting scrutiny. In
particular, the Court explained that laws designed to avoid the problems
associated with speech are strongly disfavored:
Even though the Act is content neutral, it still must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest
[and] [t]he tailoring requirement does not simply guard
against an impermissible desire to censor. The government
may attempt to suppress speech not only because it disagrees
with the message being expressed, but also for mere
convenience. Where certain speech is associated with
particular problems, silencing the speech is sometimes the
path of least resistance. But by demanding a close fit
between ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents
the government from too readily “sacrific[ing] speech for
efficiency.”272
Accordingly, the application of intermediate scrutiny to laws
targeting investigative deceptions would require the state to articulate and
defend its interests in criminalizing such lies by showing that the harm
avoided is narrowly tailored to an important government interest.” A
general ban on all lies used for undercover access in an industry is surely
too blunt a tool to survive such exacting scrutiny.
Assuming, for example, the government interest were in preventing
people from fraudulently obtaining employment and thereby performing
a general discussion of the intermediate scrutiny test, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (“The Supreme Court tests
the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions with an essentially open-ended form of
balancing.”).
268 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
269 Bhagwat, supra note 267, at 169.
270 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
271 Id. at 2526.
272 Id. at 2534.
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jobs they are not qualified to perform, there is no material harm arising
from such conduct if the undercover investigator is actually capable of
performing the job tasks at hand. Thus, the law could be more narrowly
drawn to address misrepresentations that actually interfere with the
employer’s ability to have its employees perform their assigned duties.
In this way laws that prohibit lying about having a law license or similar
professional training would likely survive First Amendment scrutiny. A
general ban on lies to gain employment (much less general bans on all
misrepresentations to gain access, which encompass employment lies)
would not survive strict scrutiny.
Similarly, if the state’s interest is targeted at the illegal acquisition of
confidential information, such as trade secrets, a law could be narrowly
drawn to regulate that conduct in particular. Indeed, many trade secret
and intellectual property laws are likely constitutional for exactly this
reason. By contrast, laws that are written as broadly as the Ag Gag
statutes manifest an intention not to address legitimate interests in
property or fraud prevention, but to criminalize the conduct of undercover
investigators in order to suppress their speech.
Finally, intermediate scrutiny also typically requires that the law in
question leave “open ample alternative channels” for the speech
impinged by the law in question.273 For any industry, but particularly in
the secretive agricultural industry, it is unlikely that any viable
alternatives to undercover whistleblowing exist. The lies are speech (or
conduct) that facilitate the production of undercover videos showing the
real time production of food. Merely pointing to the ability to protest on
the street or leaflet or hold rallies is no answer to the law’s ability to
utterly foreclose access to investigative reporting in the agricultural
industry. There really is no ample alternative forum through which
activists and journalists might carry out this type of expression, and thus
even under intermediate scrutiny, these Ag Gag laws would be found to
be an unconstitutional infringement of expression.274
273

Id. at 2522.
Ag Gag laws and similar statutes criminalizing investigative deceptions are also
vulnerable to claims that they are unconstitutionally overbroad. The First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine requires that laws be invalidated when they restrict significantly more speech
than the First Amendment allows. Criminal statutes must be examined particularly carefully.
Such laws are particularly dangerous from a First Amendment perspective because of their
potential to chill important expression. Overbreadth law protects individuals who “may well
refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible
of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). Ag Gag
laws typically criminalize a wide range of conduct, some of which is not protected by the First
Amendment (such as using force to enter, obtain records from, or obtain employment with an
agricultural production facility), but a substantial amount of which is protected expression under
the First Amendment, such as using misrepresentations in further of an animal welfare
274
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B. Limiting Principles – Cognizable Harm as a Precondition to
Criminalizing Lies
The previous discussion attempts to situate investigative deceptions
within the Court’s tiers of scrutiny for the First Amendment and
concludes that strict scrutiny most likely applies to laws criminalizing
such lies. But even if investigative deceptions are recognized as high
value speech subject to strict scrutiny, it is important to note that the law
would still leave the government ample room to regulate material
misrepresentations that endanger identifiable and tangible privacy and
property interests. A critical piece of the doctrinal framework for
understanding high value lies is developing a coherent set of limiting
principles, which we attempt to do in this final section.
The most significant limiting principle is easily stated: Lies that cause
material third party harm fall outside the ambit of the First Amendment’s
protection.275 Both the plurality and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Alvarez recognized this as limit on the protections afforded to lies by
noting variously that the lie must not produce “legally cognizable
harm”276 or be used to gain “material advantage”277; and that the lie must
not have caused “actual injury”278 or “specific harm.”279 Under this view,
the government may not criminalize lying “in contexts where harm is
unlikely.”280 As we discuss in this section, it is, therefore, necessary to
define with some specificity what constitutes a legally cognizable harm
in the context of investigative deceptions. Regulations of lies that cannot
fairly be regarded as the legal cause of an injury are protected speech and
subject to either strict or intermediate scrutiny, depending on the analysis
above.

investigation. Because the laws often prohibit any type of misrepresentation used to gain access
to an agricultural operation, they reach a wide range of expression, including, but not limited to,
falsely asking to use a restroom to gain access to a property to failing to disclose one’s political
affiliations. As such, they sweep well beyond the scope of conduct that may be constitutionally
regulated. Moreover, a law is more likely to be deemed overbroad if it is impinging speech of
particular political salience. Richard Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,
894 (1991).
275 But see Norton, supra note 7, at 187-99 (dividing harms into “second-party” (i.e., listener)
and “third-party” (i.e., broader social) harms.)
276 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012).
277 Id. at 2548.
278 Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
279 Id. at 2556. Id at 2255 (noting that “proof of injury” is a general requirement for
outlawing lies).
280 Id. at 2555.
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As Professor Varat has observed, there are two main categories of
potential interests that might limit First Amendment protection for lies
designed to secure truthful information. The first possible interest would
be in protecting the listener from “psychological or pecuniary harm” that
the investigative deception caused “directly and independently.”281
Second, there is a potential indirect harm caused by “the subsequent
publication of the accurate information obtained as the result of the lie.”282
We address each of these categories in the following sections.
1. Possible Direct Harms
There are, of course, easy examples at both extremes of the spectrum
of direct harms caused by lies. Defamation causes financial and
reputational harm and falls beyond the scope of First Amendment
protection.283 The same is true of common law fraud, which has as an
element actual injury.284 Likewise, crimes like perjury or lying to
government officials impose materiality requirements, which typically
require a showing of some likely injury or harm flowing from the lie,285
and in any event lies that may cause our democratic system of governance
to falter are always safely categorized as harm causing. On the other end
of the spectrum fall white lies and puffery. Intentionally lying and telling
a co-worker that he does good work, or that he always dress
professionally, for example, is clearly protected speech.286
It is not terribly difficult to fit laws barring investigative deceptions
such as Ag Gag laws into this framework. To the extent that Ag Gag
laws impose criminal penalties on misrepresentations to gain access to
agricultural operations, they do so without reference to any tangible harm
caused by the misrepresentations themselves. The laws criminalize the
281

Varat, supra note 7, at 1122-23.
Id. at 1123.
283 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985).
284 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.
285 Materiality in this context is often defined as lies which could have affected the outcome
of a governmental proceeding. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-501(1) (2014 West) (“affected the
course or outcome of an official proceeding, or the action or decision of a public servant, or the
performance of a governmental function”). More importantly, it is recognized that perjury
undermines the credibility and legitimacy of our justice system, thus causing a grave social harm.
See, e.g., Nicole Oelrich Tupman & Jason Tupman, No Lie About It, the Perjury Sentencing
Guidelines Must Change, 59 S.D. L. REV. 50, 64 (2014); John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui
Tam Action for Perjury in A Civil Proceeding Is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil
Judicial System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 785 (2006) (“the judicial branch has a genuine interest in
addressing the harm that perjured testimony causes to the civil judicial system.”).
286 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (Kozinski, J., concurring in denial
of rehearing en banc) (cataloguing a long list of such lies and identifying the lie as an essential
feature of modern communication).
282
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access itself and any other harm that occurs during the course of the entry
– whether it be the theft of property, destruction of property, or loss of
trade secrets – is independent from and separately punishable under
distinct criminal provisions.
a. Trespass
One likely basis for a legitimate assertion of harm to a protected
interest would be the property right to possession. One who enters
through deception, so the argument goes, would be harming the exclusive
possessory interests of agricultural operations owner in ways analogous
to a trespass.287 Notably, however, it is axiomatic under common law
that civil trespass complainants need not show actual damages as a
precondition of liability.288 Liability for trespass will presumptively only
result in the imposition of nominal damages, and any recovery of more
than that requires a showing of actual damage.289 That is to say, even if
one strains to categorize entry through deception as trespass, because
trespass is understood generally as imposing liability without harm, there
is no basis for understanding all such deceptions as beyond the realm of
First Amendment protection. Quite the contrary.
There is generally no harm cognizable at law caused by entry gained
through investigative deceptions. As Judge Posner has vividly explained,
entry into a business through deception where one wants or invites entry
(but does not know the investigators true purpose) is not a true trespass
because in such cases there is no invasion of the “the specific interests
that the tort of trespass seeks to protect.”290 Needless to say, if an
undercover investigator actually caused physical damage to property,
personal injury, or some other tangible harm arising from an
287

17 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE § 10.2 (2d ed.) (2014) (consent can be a defense to
trespass, “provided it was not obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or duress. . . .”); Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (M.D. N.C. 1996). But see Laurent
Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 877, 882 (2014) (suggesting that trespass
advances privacy interests).
288 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 28 (3d ed. 2010).
289 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE, §18-7008(A)(9) (establishing a misdemeanor for “Entering
without permission of the owner or the owner’s agent, upon the real property of another person
which” is posted with proper signage indicating that the property is private and may not be
trespassed upon). Interestingly, all other provisions of the Idaho criminal trespass statute entail
actual tangible harm to the property. Id. at §18-7008(A)(1)-(8), (10).In contrast it is common for
statutory trespass actions to require actual damages. While some state criminal trespass laws may
be enforced even without a showing of actual harm, it is widely recognized that the sort of privacy
and property rights protected by trespass laws are simply not served by punishing someone who
gains access through deception.
290 Id.
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investigation, she could be held criminally or civilly liable. But the act
of accessing a place through deception does not in and of itself cause a
legally cognizable harm.291 The absence of any harm and the “inevitable
effect” of the laws on investigative journalism and other speech activities
doubtlessly implicates First Amendment protection.292
b. Interference with Business Operations and Hiring Practices
Another interest that the state may legitimately protect is the
agriculture enterprise’s ability to carry out its business lawfully. Thus,
any misrepresentation that leads to direct interference with business
operations (as distinguished from the self-inflicted economic harm
resulting from the exposure of unlawful treatment of animals) could be
constitutionally punished. Similarly, the state has a legitimate interest in
helping businesses protect trade secrets and other secret proprietary
information that allows them to fairly compete in the economic
marketplace.293 Again, misrepresentations that are used to secure such
information are within the state’s authority to regulate because the harm
that is avoided is concrete. But they are also clearly covered by more
specific available legal remedies, and therefore these interests are
satisfied by less restrictive alternatives than laws that ban investigative
deceptions.
There is another way of viewing the state’s interest in protecting
business operations, and that is through the idea that investigative
deceptions might interfere with a business’s hiring practices, as opposed
to its general operations. As the Alvarez plurality emphasizes, the First
Amendment does not protect fraudulent speech, which may include lies
made in order to “secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say
offers of employment.”294 As to lies by undercover investigators who seek
employment, then, that might seem to be the end of the matter as a cursory
reading of Alvarez would suggest that employment securing lies are
beyond the First Amendment. But the matter is not so simple. Not all
lies to gain employment are on equal footing. The passages in Alvarez
291 Lies to reveal intimate, private details may present different questions. As Judge Posner
has elaborated, “If a homeowner opens his door to a purported meter reader who is in fact nothing
of the sort—just a busybody curious about the interior of the home—the homeowner's consent to
his entry is not a defense to a suit for trespass.” Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d
1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995)
292 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
293 Id. at 1352 (“if a competitor gained entry to a business firm's premises posing as a
customer but in fact hoping to steal the firm's trade secrets,” that would be trespass) (citing
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir.1991)).
294 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
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regarding employment are dicta because the Court was not considering a
lie used to get a job, much less the diversity of employment related lies,
some of which are surely protected and some of which are just as clearly
not.
To put the issue of employment-based investigative deceptions in
context, consider the lies told by Xavier Alvarez and their potential
impact. Alvarez’s lies about his military experience and honors were not
the sort of generic puffery that would have struck many judges as
protected speech; instead, they were the sort of lies that are designed to
gain credibility or at least reputational benefits on the lying speaker.295
Such lies, though perhaps not persuasive to many, were made, according
to the Supreme Court, in order to “gain respect” from the public and his
fellow board members.296 In other words, the lie was made intentionally,
and with the purpose of securing undeserved respect in the community,
something that is not trivial to politicians, even local politicians. Yet
because the lie did not cause any legally cognizable injury, six Justices
agreed it was protected speech.297 If a politician’s lies about
accomplishments, even military honors, are protected speech, then the
range of lies that cause cognizable harm is relatively small and a vast
range of mistruths is entitled to First Amendment protection.
One particularly important category of lie that is unlikely to cause an
injury sufficient to place it outside of the First Amendment’s protections
is lies to gain access to an agricultural facility by investigators pretending
to seek employment or other false pretense for entering the premises. On
the one hand, telling an employer that he has beautiful kids, or that you
have always dreamed of working in a slaughterhouse, or even that you
are a born again Christian, might very well impact one’s decision to hire
you. In that sense the lie is relevant, and maybe even material, to the
employment decision. But such lies are not the sort of harm-causing,
material lies that fall outside the First Amendment. The harm that befalls
an employer following such an employment decision, if any, is the harm
of exposing non-defamatory information discovered during the
employment to the public.298 Similarly, loyalty to a cause might make
one a more desirable employee, but omissions or misrepresentations
about political or ideological disagreement with the industry or employer
295

Id. at 2542.
Id.
297 Id.
298 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (recognizing that both the “broadcast” and the “production of
the broadcast” are protected by the First Amendment and noting that the target of an undercover
exposé has no legal harm when the business secrets are revealed even if e target has no legal
remedy even if the “investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational,
unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly.”).
296
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fall into the class of lies to which the First Amendment applies, because
there is no harm as a matter of law.299 Simply failing to disclose an
investigative purpose does not, without more, cause legally cognizable
injury any more than failing to disclose a desire to unionize a
workplace.300
On the other hand, a wide range of employment related lies might
easily be characterized as falling outside the reach of the First
Amendment. Lying about one’s qualifications for a job – claiming to
have a law degree or training in the operation of heavy equipment, or
other certificates or special skills – are quintessential examples of lies that
typically do not enjoy First Amendment sanction. These lies relate to the
essential function or task of the job and can cause cognizable injury to
employers by exposing them to liability risks as well as an unsafe or
unqualified work force. Work that is done less safely or less productively
is a cognizable injury and lies made to shield inexperience or lack of
credentials may cause such injury. Such fraudulent representations might
lead to actual and direct harm to a business’s operations and perhaps to
harm to third parties, as in the case of an employee who creates safety
risks because she is not trained in the way she represented.301 But when
the lie has no bearing on the requisite qualifications of the individual and
no relationship to the ability of the individual to safely and effectively
perform the work in question, the First Amendment clearly implicated.
Strikingly, even the wages paid to undercover investigators who take
employment based on lies will not generally result in harm to the
employer that is proximately caused by the lies so long as the employees
perform all of their duties competently. That is to say, a lie that enables
a journalist to obtain paid employment and thus causes the employer to
experience the most concrete and measurable harm – a financial expense
– is not a legally cognizable harm. As the leading circuit court decision
on this point explains:
299

Of course, answering this threshold question – the very question at issue in Alvarez – does
the First Amendment apply at all, is not the end of the inquiry. If a factual showing can be made
that lies about loyalty, among other things, materially harm the employer, than the lie might still
be criminalized because appropriately tailored legislation could satisfy strict scrutiny. But these
are generally factual questions – does the law satisfy the applicable scrutiny. Our goal is to make
clear that as a legal matter such scrutiny should be applied, and such a factual showing must be
made.
300 For example, “salting” is a common union practice whereby union organizers seeking to
organize a particular employer’s workforce may apply for a job without disclosing their status as
a salt or union organizer. See e.g., Harman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. NLRB, 280
F.3D 1110, 1111 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The only purpose of criminalizing such a lie could be to
discourage salting, an activity protected by the [National Labor Relations] Act.”
301 Thus, where tangible harms result, the constitutional implications are different. See
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (rejecting newspaper’s First Amendment
defense to suit by confidential source who claimed the newspaper breached its promise to protect
his identity from public disclosure resulting in the loss of his job).

[24-Mar-15

HIGH VALUE LIES

59

The question is what was the proximate cause of the
issuance of paychecks to Dale and Barnett. Was it the
resume misrepresentations or was it something else? It
was something else. Dale and Barnett were paid because
they showed up for work and performed their assigned
tasks as Food Lion employees. Their performance was at
a level suitable to their status as new, entry-level
employees. Indeed, shortly before Dale quit, her
supervisor said she would “make a good meat wrapper.”
And, when Barnett quit, her supervisor recommended that
she be rehired if she sought reemployment with Food Lion
in the future. In sum, Dale and Barnett were not paid their
wages because of misrepresentations on their job
applications.302
If a lie to gain employment does not cause a legal “injury” to the employer
who pays the wages, then a wide range of injuries suffered by the
employer (or accessed party) are also not caused by the lie.303 Certainly,
the run of the mine lie about one’s interest in the field, an underselling of
one’s credentials, a lie about political or ideological beliefs, or a lie about
investigative motives does not cause such harm, and as such these lies
fall within the First Amendment protections recognized in Alvarez.304
302 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 1999); id.
(holding that lost sales and profits were not caused by the undercover investigation but by the
information disclosed by the publication of the investigation’s findings).
303 Food Lion stands for the proposition that the harms occasioned by investigative reporting
are “caused not by [the Reporter’s] conduct but by Food Lion's own labor and food handling
practices.” Symposium, Panel I: Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 424 (1997).
304 Of course, a wide range of injuries suffered by an employer can fairly be said to have
been caused by a lie. Criminalizing deceptive entry for the purpose of stealing intellectual
property, clients or trade secrets is likely permissible. Likewise, acts of terrorism or sabotage or
the like committed by persons gaining access under false pretenses will always be the cause of
injury to the victimized employer or citizen, and the lies that make such acts possible could be
criminalized. Perhaps even lies about one’s desire to remain employed for an extended period of
time with the same employer could give rise to actual cognizable harm in certain instances. But
even in the face of explicit lies about one’s desire to remain employed, it may be difficult to show
that such a lie caused the damage in question. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 513 (“Because Dale
and Barnett did not make any express representations about how long they would work, Food
Lion is left to contend that misrepresentations in the employment applications led it to believe the
two would work for some extended period. There is a fundamental problem with that contention,
however. North and South Carolina are at-will employment states, and under the at-will doctrine
it is unreasonable for either the employer or the employee to rely on any assumptions about the
duration of employment. At-will employment means that (absent an express agreement)
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Finally, while employers might argue that investigations resulting
from deceptive employment applications breach a common law duty of
loyalty arising from the employment relationship, those duties have
typically been limited to direct interference with the employer’s business
operations, as where an employee directly competes with her employer,
misappropriates property, profits, or business opportunities, or breaches
confidences, such as revealing trade secrets.305
In short, lies about sexual orientation, love of sports, or marital status,
no less than lies about fidelity to the employer’s cause, may impact the
employment decision. But these lies do not obviously cause any concrete
injury to the employer. As such, the lie should be viewed as speech (or
conduct facilitating speech) and the regulation should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny.306
c. Privacy and Autonomy
Finally, a law may legitimately protect reasonable expectations of
individual privacy on commercial premises. Speech is always entitled to
more protection if it is of public concern, and thus investigative
deceptions may serve to facilitate politically important speech on issues
relating to how certain industries are operating. But the importance of
speech about an industry does not make everything that happens at the
facility politically significant. Thus, a law that forbade someone from
gaining access to private information, such as individual income tax or
health insurance records, or to areas of a commercial enterprise in which
expectations of privacy are commonplace, such as workplace restrooms
or employee locker/changing rooms, would advance valid personal
privacy concerns. The First Amendment provides less protection when
the privacy implicated is of a personal nature, and this is no less true in
the context of lies that are preparatory to an investigative entry. Many
lies to gain access will cause no cognizable harm and are thus protected
by the First Amendment, but lies to gain access in ways that are harmful
to personal dignity or to concrete business interests do not deserve
constitutional sanction.

employers are free to discharge employees at any time for any reason, and employees are free to
quit.”).
305 Food Lion, 194 F.3d, at 515-16.
306 If a particular employer or industry can meet the burden of proof required for heightened
scrutiny – some showing, for example, that a particular lie or class of lies will cause financial
harm based on empirical data, then a law narrowly tailored to prevent that particular type of lie
will likely survive constitutional scrutiny.
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Furthermore, independent of actual privacy concerns, is the
previously discussed matter of the deprivation of listener autonomy. We
have already addressed that potential interest in our discussion about how
high value lies advance the speaker’s autonomy.307 In addition, as Helen
Norton has argued, the privileging of listeners’ over speakers’ autonomy
“would empower the government to punish a wide swath of lies and thus
frustrate an antipaternalistic understanding of the First Amendment.”308
.

2. Possible Indirect Harms Caused By Public Disclosure

While it may be difficult to identify any direct harms from
investigative deceptions, it is easy to recognize indirect harms to an
employer exposed to an investigative reporting effort. One such harm
that cannot be denied in the realm of investigative deceptions is the
reputational injury that flows from the publication of an exposé.
Businesses universally seek to exclude undercover investigations because
of the risk of backlash in the form of boycotts or bad publicity. A critical
source of the injury in cases of journalistic investigations is the
publication and distribution of information or images obtained during the
access that was gained by deception. For instance, the harm that befalls
a childcare facility exposed by an undercover employee investigation by
Dateline NBC is the damage to its reputation when the public sees, for
example, the abusive treatment of children. The harm to a grocery store
that is exposed for repackaging adulterated meat products by
investigators is the exposure of its unsanitary practices. Likewise, the
harm to an agricultural facility from an undercover employment
investigation is the public reaction to the food safety, animal welfare, and
labor issues that are documented or reported by the investigator.
These are serious harms. And at an intuitive level they are “caused”
by the deceptive entry into the business. However these are not harms
that can be criminalized. The harm that flows from public disclosure and
debate about non-defamatory material is a harm qualitatively different
than any other harm to one’s property or privacy interests.309 When the
harm sought to be avoided is the publication of truthful information of
public concern, the First Amendment is uniquely implicated for at least
two reasons.310
307

See supra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
See Norton, supra note 7, at 190.
309 Cf. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (“The publication damages Food Lion sought (or alleged)
were for items relating to its reputation, such as loss of good will and lost sales”).
310 See Susan M. Gilles, Food Lion as Reform or Revolution: "Publication Damages" and
First Amendment Scrutiny, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 37, 60 (2000) (“It suggests a unifying
308
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First, harms borne of publication on issues of public concern, and the
concomitant public discourse that results, are harms that cannot fairly be
traced to the lie that created the opportunity for the exposure.311 Of
course, it is true that without publication there would be no reputational
harm, but the First Amendment cannot tolerate a limitation on lies simply
because they may lead to the publication of information that is otherwise
unavailable, at least not when the information is non-intimate, nondefamatory, and of great political importance.312 Just as the wages paid
to the employees conducting undercover investigations are not caused by
the lie but by the work that was completed, the harm of publication is not
caused by the lie, but by the bad acts that the investigator recorded or
documented. The lie itself facilitates access, and if one does poor work
or appears disloyal, or overly snoopy, he can be fired at will; the lie is
instrumental to publication but is not the true cause of the harms of
publication.313 As one commentator has summarized the law:

constitutional principle for all actions against the media precisely because it treats the cause of
action filed as irrelevant. First Amendment scrutiny is triggered if a plaintiff seeks damages based
on publication.”).
311 But see Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (“No interest
protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion to be
enhanced by the fact of later publication of the information that the publisher improperly
acquired.”). A number of cases dating back to an era of very different and more robust
expectations of privacy reach similar conclusions, extending the media's liability for
newsgathering torts to damages arising from the ensuing publications. Sims, supra note 170, at
542 n.187 (1998) (compiling such cases). These cases have been rightly and roundly criticized
by the few commentators who have paid attention to them. See, e.g., Jacqueline A. Egr, Closing
the Back Door on Damages: Extending the Actual Malice Standard to Publication-Related
Damages Resulting from Newsgathering Torts, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 693, 712-13 (2001) (“The
Dietemann court erred in simply relying on the common law without incorporating First
Amendment principles into its decision. Although Dietemann allegedly sought damages for
invasion of privacy, the real harm, arguably, was his loss of reputation or esteem in the community
resulting from the publication of the article and photographs disclosing his medical ‘quackery.’
Based on this theory, the court allowed Dietemann to recover damages coextensive with those
awarded for a defamation claim without meeting the actual malice standard.”).
312 A case that is frequently cited in defense of Ag Gag statutes is Houchins v. KQED, Inc,,
which, through a fractured plurality, denied the press unlimited access to a prison facility. 438
U.S. 1, 15 (1978). Notably, however, the controlling concurrence in Houchins, Justice Stewart’s
concurrence, explains that the First Amendment’s freedom of press is not a mere redundancy. Id.
at 16. If ever the Court should recognize a distinct freedom of press right, it should be in the
context of lies to gain access, to non-intimate details of great political significance.
313 The defamation related protections are designed to protect against allegations of injury
arising from publication. Some have argued that in newsgathering cases, the injury to the plaintiff
occurs during the investigation and prior to publication, thus arguing that speech rights are less
implicated by limits on investigations through generally applicable laws. Sims, supra note 170,
at 526. In the Ag Gag context, however, exactly the opposite is true. The lie is the act of speech
that facilitates an investigation and eventual publication. Arguably any harm from publication is
too attenuated from the lie itself to justify depriving the lie of First Amendment protection.
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Courts have advanced several reasons why publication
damages are not the proximate cause of newsgathering
torts. Some follow the Food Lion district court’s
conclusion that the acts of the plaintiff depicted in the
publication are the real proximate cause of publication
damages, rather than newsgathering torts that merely
facilitated access to learning about those acts. Others give
no reason at all.314
As explained immediately above, lies that do not implicate the
essential qualifications or functions of the job, but rather omit or
affirmatively conceal journalistic or investigative motives, do not
proximately cause harm by exposing unsavory or criminal acts observed
as an undercover employee. Such investigative deceptions are surely the
cause in fact, in the sense that it is logical to believe that an employer
would not offer a job to someone looking to document and expose
unseemly or illegal industry practices. But the lie to gain employment in
these contexts does not produce any legally cognizable harm because the
lie is not the proximate cause of any reputational injury. An action is said
to be the legal or proximate cause of harm only if it causes the harm
through a “natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause.”315 Stated differently, the law of causation and the
First Amendment cannot countenance a system in which the exposure of
one’s wrongdoing is treated as an actionable cause of the injury that flows
from the exposure.316 To imagine such a regime of free speech law is to
turn the First Amendment on its head insofar as the more newsworthy
and politically salient the investigative publication – the more effective
the investigation and the more damaging its revelations – the lower the
First Amendment protection and the more likely there would be
314 Nathan Siegel, Publication Damages in Newsgathering Cases, 19 COMM. LAW. 11, 15
(2001) (“One reason the means by which raw information is obtained is not the proximate cause
of publication damages is because that raw information harms no one. Rather, damage is caused
by the way that information is subsequently presented in the publication, including the meaning
that the publication ascribes to it editorially. Thus, the content and viewpoint of the ultimate
publication, and the decisions made to express that content, are the proximate causes of
publication damages.); id. (“inherent in the concept of proximate cause is that something more
than literal causation is required. In addition, policy judgments must be made about the
appropriate allocation of responsibility for harms involving a particular course of conduct.”).
315 James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 185 n.99 (1925).
316 The illegal or unsavory acts documented by an undercover investigator are the intervening
cause that breaks the chain. If an investigator gains employment at a childcare facility and
documents unsafe or criminal interactions with the children, neither the recording nor the recorder
are the cause of the harm that will flow to the business; rather the practices which are exposed are
the cause of harm.
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damages.317 By such logic an undercover investigation showing that a
business is an ongoing criminal enterprise would be less protected than
an investigation that did not reveal any wrongdoing.
Defenders of Ag Gag laws and similar prohibitions might argue that
the actual cause of cognizable harm to a business is the editing of the raw
footage showing wrongdoing. Indeed the history of Ag Gag laws is
replete with references to the fact that the agricultural industry and their
supporters view with great suspicion the editing that investigators in these
industries conduct before publishing the videos.318 Legislators and
industry representatives have repeatedly referred to the investigations as
orchestrated or staged, and on this basis justified the Ag Gag laws. Of
course, if the harm is staged or unfairly edited videos, then “the real
conduct being challenged . . . . is editorial conduct, not newsgathering
[and] . . . publication damages should only be permitted through the tort
that challenges those decisions directly, defamation, rather than through
fraud or trespass claims that have nothing to do with editorial content.”319
Bypassing the limits on defamation liability by using other tort claims is
already prohibited under the common law, and when the circumvention
of defamation limits takes the form of a criminal statute, the First
Amendment concerns are even greater.
To state the matter as plainly as possible, even if one could say that
the lie causes harm by making possible the recordings and eventual media
attention, the resulting reputational harm to the investigated business is
not a cognizable injury. The Supreme Court has been steadfast in holding
that the First Amendment limits on defamation actions apply to all tort or
criminal actions that attempt to prevent reputational injuries based on
publication.320 If the ultimate harm flowing from the lie is damage to
317

Siegel, supra note 331, at 15 (2001) (“companies would receive compensation for the
public's refusal to tolerate their potentially antisocial conduct”).
318 Susie Cagle, Two Views on ag-gags: The investigator and the farm advocate, GRIST (Apr.
25, 2013), http://grist.org/food/two-views-on-ag-gags/; Debate: After Activists Covertly Expose
Animal Cruelty, Should They Be Targeted With “Ag-Gag” Laws?, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9,
2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/debate_after_activists_covertly_expose_animal.
319 Siegel, supra note 331, at 15; id. at 16 (noting that in the context of privacy torts – such
as intrusion upon seclusion – the limits on damages are less clear, but explaining that, in part,
based on the dated nature of the precedent that predates cases like Hustler); id. (“Dietemann was
decided before much of the First Amendment jurisprudence related to publication damages was
developed. Moreover, the question of whether publication damages should be rejected on
proximate cause grounds was not raised or addressed. Thus, Dietemann did not address the
principal issues currently relevant to publication damages, and its authority may reasonably be
questioned on that ground alone.”).
320 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1967); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (holding that damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
based on publication are unavailable unless the preconditions for defamation liability, including
actual malice, are satisfied). See also Sims, supra note 170, at 511 (“Food Lion argued that its
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reputation caused by publication of truthful information, then falsity of
the publication and malice, among other things, are constitutional
prerequisites for liability.321 The lies used to facilitate access to a
business (the conduct of producing the undercover investigation) no less
than the production of the video itself, are insulated from civil or criminal
liability by the First Amendment’s stringent limits on defamation.322 To
hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the entire line of the Court’s
First Amendment defamation cases, which assume the speech is false.
Indeed, it is likely that the agricultural industry’s push for Ag Gag laws
is a direct response to the fact that they are unable to seek relief under
defamation law because the information revealed by undercover
investigations is truthful.
Moreover, the Court has recognized that the publication of truthful
information about a matter of public significance, even if obtained
unlawfully, may still be protected by the First Amendment. In Bartnicki
v. Vopper,323 the Court held that the media’s publication of the contents
of a cellphone conversation regarding a highly contentious union
negotiation were protected by the First Amendment, even where the
media had reason to believe that the conversation was illegally
intercepted and recorded. While it did not categorically conclude that all
publications of truthful information are constitutionally protected, it
adhered to its practice in past cases that “‘if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need . . . of the highest order.’”324
If lying is protected insofar as it does not cause cognizable injury, and
if publication harms short of defamation are generally not cognizable,
then lying for investigative purposes of facilitating a politically
enormous financial losses were proximately caused by the PrimeTime Live broadcast and should
properly have been included in its compensatory damage award.”).
321 Sims, supra note 170, at 556-57 (“In Food Lion, . . . injury to reputation--was an issue in
the case [and] Judge Tilley therefore recognized that Food Lion's attempt to link its reputational
injuries to the damages caused by the newsgathering torts without proving falsity or actual malice
was, in fact, an attempt to circumvent Gertz and Sullivan.”).
322 Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the
Refortification of Defamation Law's Constitutional Aspects, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 665, 666 (1989)
(“Recent years have witnessed attempts by plaintiffs to make an end-run around the obstacles
posed by defamation law's harm to reputation element and its constitutional aspects.”); Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522 (1999) (“What Food Lion sought to do, then,
was to recover defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims, without satisfying
the stricter (First Amendment) standards of a defamation claim. We believe that such an end-run
around First Amendment strictures is foreclosed by Hustler.”).
323 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
324 Id. at 528 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
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significant investigation will generally be protected speech. The lie told
by an undercover investigator – denying a desire to document food safety
issues, for example – does not cause a harm other than those caused by
the ultimate publication, and such injuries are not legally cognizable if
the publication is non-defamatory.325
VI. CONCLUSION
Lies play a surprisingly and historically important role in uncovering
truth. Investigative deceptions are the hallmark of the muckraking
tradition. Since the time of Upton Sinclair’s work at a slaughterhouse,
gaining access or even employment through deception, has led to
landmark legislative reforms, shaped public opinion, and ignited political
debate. These tactics are now routinely used by political activists as well.
More recently, these efforts to produce political speech on matters of
wide public concern by gaining access through lies have been the target
of a rash of criminal statutes. Over the past few years, dozens of states
have considered legislation that criminalizes misrepresentations used to
gain access for purposes of investigations of the agricultural industry. A
handful of states have actually enacted the laws, with other poised to do
the same. These Ag Gag laws present a timely opportunity to consider
the degree of constitutional protection for lies.
Whatever the ultimate status of lies generally under the First
Amendment, investigative deceptions are high value lies, and laws
regulating them should be subject to the most exacting constitutional
scrutiny. For decades lies have all been clumped into a dichotomy – that
is lies are either entirely unprotected, or they are a form of speech that is
disfavored, but protected insofar as is necessary to avoid chilling valuable
speech. By comprehensively identifying the doctrinal and historical case
for recognizing distinct value in investigative deceptions, this Article
destabilizes the misconception that all lies are equal. Many lies are
entitled to First Amendment protection, but no lie is more valuable than
the lie that enables important speech on issues of public concern. High
value lies have evaded judicial attention for too long, and with the rise of
Ag Gag laws their time in the First Amendment spotlight has finally
arrived. As we demonstrate, in the context of lies, the First Amendment
critically intersects with the law of causation, and because the harm
flowing from an investigation is linked to publication or exposé and not
the lie itself, investigative deceptions are entitled to strict scrutiny.
325
One could imagine that if the investigator not only lies but stages the reported conduct,
then damages would exist. Cf. Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d
1125, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that when the “unedited footage” from an undercover
investigation would show that the publication created a “false impression”, then an action for
defamation is colorable).

